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ABSTRACT

NATO's success in Kosovo ultimately depended upon each member's ability to
carefully balance national interest and opposing viewpoints against international
pressures from the Alliance. In reconciling these factors, each country created framing
strategies designed to garner public support for its involvement in the military operations.
Indigenous public support was integral to each country's participation in these efforts and
in NATO's ability to maintain a sustained campaign.
This thesis focuses specifically on the strategies used by the government leaders
in the United States, Italy and Germany, to influence public opinion and gain national
support for military involvement during NATO's operations in Kosovo from March-June
1999. It examines the political climate and national issues unique to each country as they
impacted their relationship with NATO regarding the use of force in Kosovo. Struggles
between political parties, control of foreign policy and security decisions, as well as
divided public opinion, forced these governments to balance support for NATO while at
the same time addressing the oppositions concerns. In order to gain support for
participation throughout the conflict the government leaders developed framing strategies
for four key issues: the initial use of force, continued support after the Chinese Embassy
bombing, the debate on the use of force, and decisions regarding target selection. The
findings demonstrate how the interplay between national interests and the framing
strategies contributed to increased public support and provides an evaluation of the
success of the governments in advancing the overall goals of the NATO mission.
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Framing The War:
Government Strategies Used During The Kosovo Conflict

INTRODUCTION

Between March and June 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
launched a seventy-eight day air attack on Kosovo to stop Slobodan Milosevic from
violating the human rights of the Koso var people. The decision to use force came after
failed attempts by both the United Nations and NATO to use diplomatic means for
settling the dispute. The United Nations Security Council issued Resolutions 1199 and
1203 during the previous months calling for a cease-fire, and NATO sponsored the
Rambouillet conference, as well as other diplomatic initiatives, all in attempt to reach a
diplomatic settlement. The use of force also came after NATO had expanded its
membership and was on its way to defining its role in the post-cold war international
environment.
NATO's attacks on Kosovo raised a number of issues related to international
security policy. This was the first time that NATO used armed forces for a sustained
period of time. It was also the first time a regional alliance, acting without UN Security
Council authorization, had used a bombing campaign against a sovereign country with
the stated intent of ending human rights abuses. And it was the first time NATO forces
succeeded in a sustained military campaign with no allied combat fatalities.
These "firsts" raised common issues for all of the NATO allies, beginning with
the initial decision to use force. Should they use force or continue to look for a
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diplomatic solution? They also had to address the issue oflegality. Was it a violation of
international law for them to attack a sovereign country and to intervene in a domestic
situation without UN Security Council authorization? Did the fact that it was viewed by
many as a humanitarian mission make a difference? Once NATO made the decision to
use force additional decisions regarding implementation of a military strike were needed.
What would the role of each country be in the military operations, would they provide
weapons and forces, would they permit the use of their airspace, how would target
selection be decided and was there a possibility of using ground forces? NATO
involvement also raised issues related to regional relations with countries such as Russia
and China. Was there a potential that NATO action would disrupt the overall peaceful
environment? Since this was the first time NATO was involved in a sustained military
campaign, the issues dealt with among the Alliance members had to be viewed in light of
the present consequences and the precedents that were being set for future interpretation
of international law.
Although the operation took place under NATO's umbrella, each country had to
discover its own answers to these questions. Additionally, issues specific to the internal
beliefs and politics of each country had to be resolved. Each had different reasons for
being involved and for some they needed to overcome resistance within their own
borders. For example, the government of the United States, as the sole world
superpower, felt it had an obligation to stop a totalitarian leader and end the ethnic
cleansing and oppression they saw taking place. The United Kingdom, as a member of
the Contact Group, 1 wanted to bring about a resolution for Kosovo and believed in the

Members of the Contract Group for Kosovo were France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, United
Kingdom and the United States.
1
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need to threaten the use of force in order to make this happen. For France, this was the
opportunity to encourage greater action by Europeans to support regional security.
Germany's primary concern was that this was its first major military involvement abroad
since World War II and the comparisons between Kosovo and the Holocaust meant that
despite a coalition government they had to ensure cohesion and support for the alliance.
In Italy, the government was tom between its alliance with NATO and its own power
aspirations within the Euro-Atlantic security community. They also experienced internal
political divisions and had fears of destabilizing Albania. Turkey was careful not to draw
attention to its actions in Kosovo so that their own problems with its Kurdish population
were not questioned. The Greeks have a strong affinity for the Serbs so they found it
difficult to fully support NATO and were concerned with the Islamic influence in the
Balkans. Hungary, NATO's newest member, had to reconcile several issues. They had
joined NATO as a means of avoiding military conflict and now found themselves in the
midst of one that NATO had started. They were also the only NATO country that shares
a border with Yugoslavia and had concerns over the Hungarian minority living in Serbia.
Given the different existing political pressures in the allied states, the
governments within each country knew that they needed to influence the public opinion
of their citizens in order to justify their involvement in NATO's military actions. One
way to influence public opinion is with media. Throughout history governments have
realized the impact that the media can have on public opinion. Although journalists and
political scientists continue to debate the direction of influence between the media
establishment and the government, during foreign policy events and specifically
humanitarian interventions, the two have continued to evolve together. Governments
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have increased the amount of people on their staffs to interact with the media and have a
greater understanding of how various vehicles (press conferences, interviews, speaking
engagements) make their position known. Media are often a part of government action.
They travel with leaders, have people permanently assigned to departments, and rely on
information from the government to fill spots in their programming.
The government of each NATO member country created a strategy for using the
media to convey the issues that were important to its political success and to gain support
of public opinion for its involvement. While debate remains regarding the role the media
played in reporting the activities during the Kosovo intervention, there is little question
that the governments of the Alliance framed its information to the public and the media in
order to support its actions. During the Kosovo conflict governments also needed to
frame the issues to fit with the media frames being used by NATO's staff to support its
actions.
In relying upon the public statements of allied leaders, media coverage during the
crisis in Kosovo, and public opinion polls, this thesis examines, through three
comparative case studies, how the United States, Italy and Germany framed their
governments' positions and used the media to gain public support for their involvement.
These findings will help us to better understand the circumstances that forced
governments to create the frames they did, the strategies used by these governments to
reconcile national interest with NATO's efforts, and how these frames, conveyed through
the media, succeeded or failed in altering pubic opinion. The thesis also provides a new
understanding of NATO's actions in Kosovo vis-a-vis past research on these events.
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CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW

NATO involvement in Kosovo

As time passes since the end of NATO's bombing campaign of Kosovo, the
amount of literature written about the subject grows substantially. Scholars debate the
success and failure of the campaign from multiple angles because this action raised a
number of questions regarding international law, hu:rnanitarian efforts, and the use of
force by a regional organization. These works focus on a variety of topics including the
history of the conflict, humanitarian and international law concerns, military operations
and national perspectives. With the hindsight that comes with time and the release of
new government reports and critical analysis, we can begin to look at the overall picture
that the Kosovo conflict has drawn. As with any war there are lessons to be learned,
decisions to be analyzed, and plans to be made for the future.
Because this was not the first conflict in the Balkans, scholars are interested in
conveying the history of the region and the underlying causes for conflict within
Yugoslavia. These works help set the stage for understanding why the events in
Yugoslavia gained world attention and why international organizations and their
members felt the need to act. Judah (2000) provides a comprehensive look at the history
of conflict within the Balkan region. His coverage includes an examination of the
historical background, the immediate time period leading to the war, the controversy of
the NATO bombing, the b~ckground to the cease-fire and the NATO peacekeeping
operation. This book describes the conflict as it appeared to those who fought it.
Malcolm (2000) provides an overview of Kosovo's long-standing cultural divisions and
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why ethnic Albanians and Serbs are struggling so violently to command the small region.
Glenny (2000) argues that the troubles in the region are the result of constant interference
by the Great Powers rather than years of mutual ethnic hatreds. Clark (2000) examines
the history of the struggle between Kosovo Albanians and the Serbs. Clark describes the
growth and potential of the movement, its subsequent stagnation and attempts to
reinvigorate it. Clark also addresses the failure of foreign governments to respond
adequately to the danger of war and failure to adopt preventative policies. Buckley
(2000) also provides a diverse collection of essays, memoirs, letters, and interviews that
comprises a robust spectrum of views on the Kosovo conflict and the NATO air
campaign, serve to question the realities and perceived realities of the outside observers
on both sides of the Atlantic.
In a peaceful post-Cold War environment military force was not the first choice of
action in settling the problems in the region. Despite diplomatic attempts to end the
human rights abuses in the area the need for the use of force became more evident in
early 1999. Scholars approach the subject of Kosovo by looking at the steps leading up
to the decision to use force, and how the framing of the conflict in a humanitarian
perspective provided justification for action. They look at whether the claims of
humanitarian motive for intervention in Kosovo are credible.
Wheeler (2001) defines the issues related to humanitarian motivation. He
explains that humanitarian motivations may not be necessary for justifiable intervention
but they are factors in assessing an intervention's legitimacy on an international level.
The humanitarian motivation issue pits pro-interventionists and anti-interventionists
against each other. Fisk (2000) provides a baJanced discussion of the arguments on both
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sides of this issue including a review of the diplomatic measures tried prior to the use of
force and humanitarian arguments regarding the increased human rights violations during
the military campaign. Since this was justified as a humanitarian mission it is important
to consider the connection the military had with humanitarian efforts. Minear, van
Baarda and Sommers (2000) explain the interaction the military had with humanitarian
actors during the conflict and point out that during the attacks little military attention was
paid to human rights abuses that took place.
One of the issues that cause the Kosovo conflict to stand out among international
disputes is the way in which NATO went about its actions. By sidestepping the United
Nations Security Council in NATO's decision to strike, as well as including principles
adopted by the G-8, 2 during its 6 May 1999 meeting, into the UN Security Council
Resolution 1244 peace settlement, the future of international humanitarian operations and
international law in relation to international organizations has been brought into question.
Several scholars have written from the legal perspective in arguing whether or not there
was legitimate justification for involvement and how this action may impact the future of
international law. Chinkin (1999) outlines the issues related to the legality of NATO
action and highlights the dichotomy of the arguments between the need to act as a
humanitarian measure and the legal restrictions not to. She points out that the Kosovo
conflict has undermined the United Nations Charter and may impact how others will
accept it in the future. In addition, other aspects of international law were also brought
into question. Burton (2001) also addresses whether the decision to bomb was lawful
under international law. She looks at the exact provisions in the United Nations Charter

Membership of the G-8 was composed of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United
Kingdon, and the United States, with a representative from the European Union.
2
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and the NATO treaty used to justify the use of force and points out criticisms of those
arguments. However, she also looks at customary international law, practices that are
generally accepted, and finds that the decision to strike was legal as a means of
preventing genocide. Falk (1999) explains that international law may not be able to fully
justify or condemn NATO's actions. This is because there is no clear interpretation of the
texts that usually apply to international actions. Varying interpretations of the United
Nations Charter, particularly Chapter VII, and the overarching goals of the United
Nations in regards to protection of human rights help to fuel the debate rather than settle
it. He also points out that both NATO and Milosevic may have been in violation of
international law, but neither side is willing to admit fault which means varying
interpretations of the law will remain. He concludes that Kosovo does not provide a
framework for assessing future humanitarian interventions in terms of international law.
Schwabach (1999) also explores the interpretations of international legal
documents and concludes that NATO action was not legal. However, he explains that the
way other states view NATO involvement in Kosovo may bring about a change in
customary law t}iat would make such actions legal in the future. Building on this idea,
Charney (1999) explores the consequences NATO's humanitarian intervention had on
international law and demonstrates the need for better rules of law. He explains the
interpretations of the United Nations Charter and how it can be applied to humanitarian
circumstances. Furthermore, this lack of clarity in international law may make it possible
for other states to use force against sovereign states in the name of humanitarian action
but they may have other political motives as well. He develops an argument for the need
for new international law to protect human rights and then explains how a new law would
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have to be developed either by creating a new norm in the international community or by
reinterpreting the United Nations Charter. He then develops procedural and factual
requirements that would have to take place before this new law would be accepted in
order to ensure that it would protect target states and limit the risk of abuse. When these
requirements are applied to Kosovo there is still little international legal support for
intervention.
In addition to the legal questions regarding the decision to use force, Mertus
(2000) argues that the way the bombing was conducted was also illegal. She points out
that the types of weapons used, such as cluster bombs, and the height of the air flights
made the damage too indiscriminate and that the target selection put civilians at risk
thereby violating the international laws used to justify the intervention. All of the debate
regarding international law and humanitarian intervention centers on the fact that NATO
responded to the situation with military force. This was a joint military action by various
members of NATO, in which targets were selected, bombs were dropped, and people
were killed. During the course of the bombing campaign NATO flew 38.004 sorties,
attacked more than 900 targets, and expended over 28,000 weapons. As a result of these
actions between five and ten thousand Yugoslavian military personnel and five hundred
civilians were killed (Arkin, 2001, p. 21-22).
Another body of literature focuses on these military operational aspects of the war
and the lessons learned for planning and development in the future. Lyon (2001)
examines the perspective of military commanders and connects strategic decision making
to tactical implementation. He explains the cost of intervention and the impact of
strategic decisions. He looks at the varying assumptions about risk and the impact that
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variation had on the Kosovo mission. By looking at these items he recommends that
assumptions at the command levels are clearly stated. Ignatieff (2000) looks at how the
use of modem technology reduces the risks to the Alliance forces, but had little effect
against the Serbian human rights abuses. He also discusses the implications that risk-free
warfare has in dealing with the consequences of the war. He points out that war has
become a spectator sport and no longer has the moral risk of kill or be killed.
Klaus Naumann (2002), who served as chairman of NATO's Military Committee
during Operation Allied Force, presents three important lessons learned from NATO's
military involvement. First, it is important to have clear political objectives and a
willingness to use all of the means necessary to meet those objectives. Second, NATO
learned how to work together with a coalition military and how to deal with restrictions
placed on the coalition by its members in terms of preparedness and conduct. Third,
NATO learned that it would have to deal with issues of collateral damage and further
human rights violations while in pursuit of its overall objectives.
Cordesman (2001}also writes on the lessons learned during the military campaign
in Kosovo. He provides a comprehensive study of all areas related to the military
operation. He looks at the strategic aspects, the how and why the west goes to war, as
well as the impact and effectiveness of the air campaign. He also discusses the decision
to fly at high altitudes to reduce the number of casualties and responds to critics of this
decision. An important issue for the members of the Alliance during the air missions was
the strategic bombing and the selection of targets. Using data released from the U.S. and
U.K. governments, Cordesman explains how effective those decisions were in winning
the war. Lambeth (2001) reviews the military operations of NATO during its Kosovo
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involvement and identifies areas that caused problems for commanding a regional
military force. He points out that building cohesion and support within NATO may have
hampered a succinct strategy of engagement. Supplementing the official and analytical
information regarding the military effectiveness, General Wesley Clark, (2001) shares his
experiences as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. He provides a personal account of
how the war was fought and the problems that arose from leading a coalition force. He
explains the difficulties in reconciling the different viewpoints of the Alliance members
regarding strategy and targets, and the internal opposition he faced from the United States
Department of Defense.
On the opposite side of the fence, Posen (2000) presents the military strategy used
by Milosevic. He explains the political and military ways Milosevic set out to split the
coalition. It was only after his strategy had stopped working that he was willing to bring
an end to the conflict and\reduce his costs. Posen describes Milosevic's political strategy
and how he used the military as an instrument to effect the political outcomes. Milosevic
had two military objectives: gaining time for Russian influence and eroded cohesion of
the alliance, and preserving tactical freedom for Serb military and police forces. The
Serb military had experience fighting more powerful enemies and had long held
strategies they could use to prolong the attacks. Milosevic was able to use this combined
political-military strategy successfully because he could see some dissention within the
NATO coalition.
Although the military action was done under the auspices of the NATO alliance
each member country had to determine what their role would be during this action.
Schnabel and Thakur (2000) pull together the individual views of those countries
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involved in the conflict. Included in their work is an assessment of the major players; the
United States, Russia, China and major European allies, France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom. They also provide insight into the views and issues of smaller NATO
members, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Portugal, Belgium, Canada, Spain, Hungary, Poland,
and the Czech Republic. Each of these were supportive of the mission but had
reservations regarding NATO's role. This country-by-country perspective highlights the
individual nature of opinions within the Alliance. Martin and Brawley (2000) further
demonstrate the Alliance's ability to work together despite variations in national interest.
The authors explain how the domestic concerns of member countries influenced the
amount of autonomy those countries had over the decisions and policies being developed
by NATO. By looking at what influenced these countries to participate, the authors
examine if there was an allied force or if the alliance itself was forced.
~

Pulling many of these issues together, Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000) review the
events that took place, before, during, and after the NATO attacks on Kosovo. They
review the way NATO members dealt with decisions, how they responded to Milosevic
and how they worked within the confines of the international organizational structure.
From this they draw lessons for the future regarding coercive diplomacy, use of force by
coalitions and prospects for future humanitarian interventions.

Kosovo and the media
While NATO and its members were dealing with the issues of planning and
implementing a war they were also trying to gain support for their actions both in the
public opinions of their citizenry and in the international arena. They were able to
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convey their reasoning and decisions through the media. As with other government
activity, the media plays a key role in disseminating information and formulating public
opinion. There have been a number of studies related to how the media reported events
during the Kosovo conflict. Most of these works criticize the way leading newspapers
and broadcast media framed their coverage. The studies point out that by perpetuating
the frames used by the governments the media failed to both critically assess NATO
action and to distinguish the propaganda from the facts. It is only by looking at the
newspapers in non-NATO countries do the studies find any dissenting coverage.
However, that coverage still reflects the positions of that country's government.
'[he media's relationship with foreign policy events, in terms of coverage and
impact, has been studied for over four decades. Scholars (Cohen, 1963; Herman, 1993;
Jakobsen, 2000; Strobel, 1997) in the fields of journalism and political science look at the
ways the media affect policy, the ways governments influence the media and under what
circumstances the media is or is not influential. Studies have examined both the media
coverage before and after key foreign policy decisions have been made and the work that
the government was doing during the same time to determine the cause and effect
relationship. Media coverage during NATO's involvement in Kosovo continues the
debate over the media's role in information dissemination and its role in providing a
critical analysis of the events taking place.
Continuing the debate about media's role in providing non-biased coverage of
government actions, a body of literature has been published since the end of the conflict
that demonstrates how the media responded to government framing and how they failed
to provide the public with a critical assessment of what was being done. In the
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introduction to the European Journal of Communication issue (2000) dealing with the
media's response to Kosovo the editors review the issues related to the media and war
coverage. They point out that several themes recur: media as a propaganda weapon,
media as the informant of public opinion, and media as a victim of censorship. They
acknowledge that the increased skill and motivation on the part of the authorities waging
war gives them the ability to control and manipulate the flow of information in order to
justify their actions and to raise public support.
In this issue Johnstone (2000) points out that the media coverage of Yugoslavia
all present an inaccurate depiction of the people or events in the country. She explains
that the media has demonized the Serbs since the early 1990s and presents explanations
for how this has happened. This supports an earlier study by Herman (1993) that shows
how governments employ ideological weapons, such as demonizing the enemy, to keep
the media interested and to help justify future military action.
In the same issue Hammond and Herman (2000) bring together a critical look of
the media coverage during the Kosovo conflict. They point out that western journalists
framed the conflict in terms of 'NATO was trying to help.' In this work Chandler (2000)
looks at how the media responded to the issue of human rights and how they often failed
to report on the damage being done and the conflict being fueled as a result of the air
strikes. Hume (2000) focuses his contribution on how the media demonized the Serbs
and drew analogies between Serbs and the Nazis.
There are a number of studies that look at how the newspapers and television
stations of various countries framed their coverage in the way that NATO wanted them
to, including the selection of facts and frames of reference. Many of these writings also
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point out, after the fact, how what was reported was incorrect or contradictory to what
was reported earlier. The primary means of looking at these issues is by conducting
media content studies, selecting the key media publications in each country and looking
at how the military operation was presented to the public during a short period of time.
These include Ackerman and Naureckas' (2000) examination of the U.S. media,
Hammond's (2000) exploration of British media, Johnstone's (2000) analysis of the
French media, and Deichmann's (2000) description of the framing used by the German
media.
Studies have also been done on how media coverage varies between countries to
see if nat{onal interests impact how the propaganda and government frames are
represented. Nohrstedt, Kaitatzi-Whitlock, Ottosen and Riegert (2000) compare
newspaper coverage in Greece, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom during the first
three days of the air strikes. While they find that there were some national differences in
the coverage there were also issues reported in a similar way in each country. They
acknowledge that a longer time frame for the study will be needed to see if national
differences in coverage remained throughout the campaign or if one frame became
dominant. Grundmann, Smith and Wright (2000) survey the press in France, Germany
and the U.K. and also find that there is some degree of transnational discourse but that
there are also national differences.
All of these studies focus on newspaper and television reporting in NATO
member countries. Studies looking at non-NATO countries show the NATO frame was
not pervasive enough to influence international public opinion Hammond, Nizamova,
and Savelieva (2000) look at the media coverage in the Russian press and find that all of
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the coverage dealt with the Russian opposition to the :fighting. The coverage dealt with
the perceived significance of the war for Russia's positions in the world, and the support
of the Serbs based on shared Orthodox religious beliefs and a common Slavic identity.
Another non-NATO county that provided a dissenting view of the Western media
coverage was India. Thomas (2000) explains that the Indian media criticized the NATO
operations in the following areas: sources and causes of the conflict, violations of
international law, consequences for the United Nations, the rationale for NATO
existence, Russian failure to protect the Serbs, and the unequal balance of military
capabilities.
Although most of the literature focuses on the lack of influence the media had on
the military actions, Robinson (2000) provides a different perspective. By looking at
United States responses to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo he
found that media coverage could influence the deployment of air power but had little
impact on the decision to use ground troops.
The literature looks at the media's actions in order to draw conclusions about the
media's role in portraying the events that took place during the Kosovo conflict. There is
an implicit understanding, throughout this literature, that the government was responsible
for the information being released and that the media had to either accept or critique what
was being given to them. Jamie Shea (2000), NATO spokesperson during the Kosovo
crisis, explains how important the media was in projecting NATO operations and in
answering the questions that the media raised regarding the conduct of the operations.
However, the existing literature does not address the specific strategies used by the allied
governments to promote its actions. Most of the coverage on the linkage between the
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media and NATO's efforts in Kosovo focuses on criticism regarding how the media
responded to the information given to them by the governments. There is little research
about how or why the government released the information that it did. The govel'l1Il}ents
made decisions on how to present its issues and involvement to the media in a way that
would increase public opinion and support for their actions.
This thesis examines the framing strategies used by Alliance member
governments to influence the public through the media. Rather than focusing on how the
media responded to the governments' frames, this study will examine the frames used by
the government leaders,in the United States, Italy and Germany and will look at the
conditions that existed in those countries that required the leaders to use the media as a
tool to influence public opinion. Through the use of public opinion polling data it will
also look at the strategies used by the governments to influence the media and under what
circumstances those strategies were successful. Before running these three case studies,
however, the thesis next discusses the methodology employed, as well as the merits and
limitations of the case study approach.
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CHAPTER 2: CASE STUDY OVERVIEW

Case Study Approach

Political scientists use the case study approach as a way of providing intense
examination of a particular phenomenon in order to answer the "how" and "why"
questions of an event. Robert Yin (1984) defines the case study as" an empirical inquiry
that investigates, a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context; when the
\

boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which
multiple sources of evidence are used" (Yin, 1984, p. 23). This approach makes the case
study particularly appealing in the field of international relations because it provides a
way to examine events at many levels of political activity. Using this approach, scholars
can focus on international or subnational events, and examine the various players in the
international arena throughout different periods of history in a systematic way.
Alexander George (1979) explains that a good case study can contribute to theory
development. A good case study occurs when the investigator is knowledgeable about
the variables and there are few unknowns. The case study will provide a very descriptive
account of the events. By following a structured focused approach to the case study it
will be replicable to future investigators and will be able to fit into the development of
theory.
The approach used during this thesis will follow the guidelines of the heuristic
case study as developed by Harry Eckstein, "as a means to stimulate the imagination
toward discerning important general problems and possible theoretical solutions"
(Eckstein, 1975, p. 104). With this approach I will be able to demonstrate the existence
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of the problem: that governments use framing strategies with the media in order to
improve public opinion and support for their military operations. By using the heuristic
approach in conjunction with Lijphart's controlled comparison (Lijphart, 1975), this
thesis will be able to identify a variety of causal patterns and develop a generalizable
theory regarding the relationships between framing strategies and public opinion during
international conflicts. The variables being considered will also allow the findings to
supplement other research studies on the Kosovo conflict.

Limitations to Case Study Research

The primary critique of the case study approach is that it provides a limited ability
to generalize and contribute to theory building. By focusing on a single event and
including a large number of descriptive factors, it is difficult to use the findings of a
single case study as a predictor. This limitation can be overcome by conducting
structured focused case studies, as described by Alexander George, in which multiple
cases are studied. By selecting cases that are relevant to the event being studied, but with
different independent variables the case study can test the possibility that a specific
outcome is possible. Jensen and Rodgers (2001) also suggest that case studies can
contribute to theory building by using meta-analysis. Rather than thinking of case studies
as independent findings, meta-analysis combines the findings across research studies.

Methodology and Structure
Research Objectives

This thesis will focus on the strategies used by Allied government leaders to
influence public opinion, through the use of the media, to gain national support for
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military involvement during NATO's operations in Kosovo from March through June
1999. Much of the literature that discusses the media's role during the Kosovo conflict
focuses on the content of the coverage and criticizes its lack of objectivity. The
'

perspective of most of this literature is that the media functions independently of the
environment and circumstances it is operating in. This thesis is unique in that it will show
the relationship the govermhents of NATO countries had with the media, and how this
relationship influenced public opinion of the events. It will also look at the impact this
relationship had on influencing public opinion. Rather than having the media as the
predominant actor, this study centers on the government leaders and the strategies they
used to frame the issues and the reasons behind the frame.
By comparing the leaders' framing strategies and public opinion of several NATO
countries this study will provide additional insight into understand NATO' s overall
response to the Kosovo conflict. Operating as an allied force NATO countries needed to
overcome their differences and present themselves as a unified force during its military
campaign. This study will show the internal factors that caused differences between the
countries and the methods each one used to either overcome these differences or
highlight their individual approaches as a means of altering domestic public opinion.
Without public support none of the individual NATO countries would have been able to
participate as broadly in the efforts and NATO's ability to maintain a sustained campaign
would have been jeopardized.
Conditions and Variables
As a structured focused case study this thesis will ask general questions of each
case in order to acquire comparable data. In the course of collecting data on these
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questions additional questions may arise that are specific to each case. I will address
these as a means of identifying the differences between the cases and to show that despite
these differences the overall outcome of each country was the same: support for the
NATO operation. For each case, this thesis will examine three factors fundamental to
their involvement during the Kosovo conflict. First, it will analyze the political
environment and historical background of each country as it impacted its relationship
with NATO and the role it played in the operation. Second, it will study the framing
strategies used by the individual governments to convey four issues to the public: (a) the
decision to use force, (b) the response to the strike on the Chinese Embassy, (c) the
debate on the use of ground forces, and (d) each government's expressed influence over
target selection. It will also illustrate the strategies used by each government to
communicate these frames to the media, which served as a vehicle for conveying the
messages to the public. Third, this thesis will show the interplay between the political
environment and the framing strategies that influenced public opinion. Each case study
will then conclude with an evaluation of the success or failure of the allied government in
advancing the overall goals of the NATO mission. Three allied states will serve as the
units of analysis: the United States, Italy and Germany. The methodology used is
developed further below.

Political Environment I Background

The NATO war in Kosovo raised important questions in the international
community and each country had to formulate a policy position on these issues. Before
the military conflict began, issues arose regarding the level of involvement countries
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should have in a domestic conflict within a sovereign territory. Was the conflict between
the Kosovars and the Serbs a domestic conflict or did the human rights abuses taking
place warrant external involvement? If so, what should the nature of that involvement be?
Beyond the individual country response to this question was the question of the role
international organizations should play? In terms of international law, what was the
appropriate role of the United Nations, NATO, or the European Union? What do they
see as the appropriate response from each of these organizations? This thesis will
describe how each country chose to answer these questions.
There were additional factors unique to each country that also influenced the
political climate. For some countries their location in the region, relations with Russia
and China or internal ethnic conflict were predominant factors in decision making. For
other countries historical responses to conflict, future roles in international security, or
domestic party disagreements contributed to the overall response to the campaign. These
issues will explain the climate that the government was working in when selecting its
framing strategies and the factors that formulated public opinion prior to the frames.

Framing Strategies

Frames are "schemata of interpretation that enable individuals to locate, perceive,
identify and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large" (Snow,
Rockford, Worden & Benford, 1986, p. 464). In applying this definition to this thesis,
frames are the government leaders' interpretation of events surrounding Operation Allied
Force as presented to the public. Once the decision to strike was made by NATO, the
individual countries then had to determine their level of involvement and rally public
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support. Alliance governments used motivational framing to answer the question of why
they should become involved. Diagnostic framing involves describing an event that is
problematic and in need of alteration, and prognostic framing proposes solutions to the
diagnosed problem that specifies what has to be done (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 199).
In terms of the Kosovo situation, government leaders used the diagnostic framing to
discuss human rights violations and specific national interests. They also used prognostic
framing to explain how they would be participating in the NATO actions. This study will
provide examples to show how each of these framing types was used to address four key
issues.
A. Initial Use of Force. At the start of the military operation, motivational
framing was critical in raising public opinion. It was during this stage that the
government leaders needed to introduce the conflict to the people and explain their
justification for involvement. The diagnostic frame used for this issue would influence
the way the prognostic frame would justify later involvement, because they would be able
to come back to the reasons given at the beginning of the conflict to reinforce the
importance of the mission. Also, during the initial use of force the public became aware
of the key players within each country. These actors would be the ones that presented the
administration's viewpoint and those that provided the counter opinions on involvement
to the public.
B. Response to Strike on Chinese Embassy. Motivational framing remained
important throughout the conflict as new issues became a concern and public support
began to wane. In spite of efforts to limit the damage done to civilian areas, collateral
damage, such as the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy, did take place. This
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increased the tension between the Allied countries and China that resulted from
circumventing the Security Council in the decision to strike. This incident also made the
public more aware that accidents could happen and damage was not restricted to Serbian
military.
C. Use of ground forces. When the campaign began, the use of ground troops was
a major area of concern. As the campaign continued, countries began to worry that the air
campaign alone may be unsuccessful in bringing down Milosevic, and the use of ground
forces would be needed to bring an end to the conflict. This was a concern to most of the
countries because the use of ground forces meant a higher likelihood of casualties. The
discussion of ground forces encompassed issues related to the level of commitment that
countries were willing to contribute, the length of time needed to solve the problems in
Kosovo and the funding needed to support the operations.
D. Influence over target selection. Once the decision to strike was made,
countries then had to formulate opinions regarding target selection and tactical plans.
During the conflict NATO attacked more than 900 targets.3 As military targets were
destroyed, and the fighting continued, non-military targets were considered. These
included power plants, petroleum reserves, communication stations and infrastructures
such as bridges and railroads. The ability to influence target selection, or the perception
of influence, served as an indication to the public that the country was actively involved
and was playing a leadership role in brining an end to the conflict. Other countries had
different pressures, with strong public opinion against the use of force and did not want to
show their close involvement in target selection.

3 In a statement made by Johh J. Hamre, Deputy Secretary of Defense, before the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, July 22, 1999.
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How did each leader present these issues to the public so that could remain a part
of the NATO operation? Official framing strategies for these issues, in each country, will
be determined by reviewing official statements in the transcripts of press conferences,
public interviews and interactions between government leaders. The content of these
statements will illustrate the government's position and the manner in which it was
articulated. Throughout this thesis, the phrase government leader refers to the president
and cabinet with the United States and the leadership of the coalition governments in
Italy and Germany. The process these leaders used to determine the official frame in
their country is dictated by the political climate and history and will be discussed in detail
in the political environment section of each chapter. Statements from other members of
government will be used to demonstrate support or opposition to the official frame.
In order for the frames to be successful the media became the vehicle for
transmitting the government's position to the public. During the Kosovo conflict, the
media consisted of newspaper, radio, television and Internet coverage. All of these
together contributed to the overall impact on public opinion. The scope of this study,
however, prevents coverage of events in all of these media outlets in its analysis. Rather
it will discuss how the governments managed these outlets to present their frames. It will
look at the quantity and frequency of interactions between government leaders and these
media outlets and how the governments countered dissenting viewpoints.

Public Opinion

The primary reason the government was framing the issues in a particular way
was to gain support for their actions among the general public. According to democratic
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theory, the leaders of NATO governments had a responsibility to take into account the
will of the people. By looking at responses to public opinion polls conducted within the
countries this study will explore how well the public supported the leaders' actions.
Cross-national surveys conducted by Angus-Reid and Gallup International supplemented
with data from local polling organizations will be used to monitor public opinion
throughout the course of the campaign. This study will look at questions that measure
overall support for NATO activity, the use of ground troops, responses to collateral
damage and &upport for country involvement.

Evaluation ofStrategy

By looking at government framing and public response in this systematic way, it
will allow for comparison among the cases while at the same time contrast the differences
between each of the countries. Because the countries were operating within the NATO
framework an evaluation will be done to assess how well each country dealt with their
individual issues and contributed to overall goals of NATO operations. The thesis will
also con"lude with policy recommendations on government relationships with the media
during times of conflict.

Selection of Cases

Studies of the NATO conflict and the media's role during the conflict have tended
to use either NATO or the media in general as the unit of analysis. This thesis narrows
the focus by using the statements of government leaders as the unit of analysis in order to
demonstrate that although the regional alliance was the primary actor in the military
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operations, this was possible only as a result of individual leaders being able to raise
domestic support. The selection of cases is limited to those countries that were members
ofNATO during the Kosovo conflict between 24 March and 9 June 1999. This study
will look at the United States, Italy and Germany. As Lijphart suggests, cases are
selected to maximize the variance of the independent variables (Lijphart, 1975, 164).
Each of these countries was selected because of the variety of specific issues taking place
within the countries that forced them to frame their media strategies in a particular way,
and because their issues played an important role in their relationship with NATO. The
countries selected include those that played a major and minor role, those that supported
and opposed NATO involvement, and all of whom felt they had direct stakes in the
outcome.
United States. As a leader within NATO and a key player in European security
the United States support for the Kosovo operation was crucial to it success. It provided
the majority of the weapons used, as well as the military commander of the operation.
However, the United States was not without domestic issues influencing its involvement.
·At the start of the military campaign, there was division between the executive and
legislative branches regarding U.S. involvement and later debates took place on the
possible use of ground force troops. The decision to attack the Serbs also came at a time
when support for the Clinton administration was at a low, following the impeachment
decision by Congress. It was essential for the administration to demonstrate the
importance of this mission to the American people. As the single superpower in the
world, many other countries were looking toward the United States as their guide. The
actions and decisions made by the United States would significantly influence those of

Tipton

- 28 -

other countries. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States was also interested in
improving relations with Russia. The United States was also chosen because it is covered
in many of the international media outlets so the frames used by the United States may
have impacted the frames used by other countries.
Italy. Though not as dominant as the United States, Italy has been a continued

supporter of NATO operations and international peace efforts. They are also interested in
increasing their individual role as a leader in European security. During the Kosovo
conflict Italy experienced substantial internal political divisions. The Italian government
is made up of a coalition of many political parties that struggle for control of foreign
policy and security decisions. Domestic issues also caused Italy to be interested in
addressing the humanitarian crisis in Yugoslavia. Italy had seen a rise in Albanian
immigrants in the post Cold War years and saw its need to contain the Kosovo conflict as
a means of preventing additional refugees into the country. They were also concerned
about Albania's stability, which they were interested in protecting. Italy actively
participated in the military campaign by providing planes, crews and the use of air bases.
Public opinion in Italy was divided so the government was trying to balance between
supporting NATO and at the same time developing peace proposals. Italy also had to
deal with domestic terrorism that was attributed to its participation in the NATO
campaign.
Germany. The Kosovo conflict came shortly after a newly elected coalition

government took office. They had to reconcile their involvement with their desire for a
non-violent foreign and security policy. The Green Party itself was tom between its
stance of rejecting the use of force and its commitment to humanitarian values. It also
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had to deal with conflicting views between left-wing leadership and traditional party
beliefs. There was long-established support for international law and the role of the
United Nations. Because of the historic role Germany played during World War II, and
the comparisons between Kosovo and the Holocaust, they had to show the world that
they were willing to participate in order to protect the human rights of the Kosovar
people. In addition to conflicting views on involvement, there was strong opposition to
the selection of civilian targets. Germany also held the position of president of the
European Union during the Kosovo conflict, so they were particularly interested and
influential in finding the solution for peace. Throughout the conflict, the German
government was the one who worked most closely as an intermediary between western
governments and Russia and China.

Theory Development
The methodology used in these case studies can contribute to further theory
development. Additional countries can be studied to discover if the relationships
between frames and pubic opinion holds true. These case studies can serve as a building
block for studies that focus on country level involvement in the Kosovo conflict. It also
fits with media studies as a way of explaining the media coverage during this time period.
During future international humanitarian relief efforts it will be useful to draw on lessons
learned during the Kosovo conflict and the following case studies outline a fraction of
what has been learned so far. This thesis will also provide a new understanding of
NATO's actions in Kosovo in relationship to past research on these events.
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CHAPTER 3: UNITED STATES

Political Environment I Background

The decision to use force against Milosevic and the Serbian military, in order to
stop the violence in Kosovo, was not an easy one to make for the Clinton administration.
The United States' role in the post Cold War environment, domestic concerns, relations
with Congress, the memory of earlier military operations, and disagreements on strategy
and policy among the top level national security team were all factors impacting how,
when and why the United States would get involved. It was not until all of the key
decision makers were able to agree on how to handle the situation that President Clinton
began raising support for action domestically and among the NATO allies. While this
consensus was developing, the United States relied on traditional diplomatic efforts to try
to reach a peaceful settlement between Milosevic and the Kosovar people.
In defining its role as the sole superpower, after the Cold War, the United States
stepped in, where national interests were concerned, to bring stability to regions and stop
the spread of humanitarian abuses. However, in the post cold war environment it was
often difficult to know how national interests would be affected or the impact that a
situation would have on the international peace (Nye, 1999). Because humanitarian
crises can be seen as less critical to national security, Congress is more likely to get
involved and try to influence the actions of the president (Carey, 2001, p. 76).
Congressional involvement may have slowed down the United States response but did
not stop the Clinton administration from getting involved when it felt necessary. The
United States, under the Clinton administration, had a history of involvement in
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humanitarian activities including Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia. They also participated in
actions in East Timor, Sierra Leone, Liberia and other United Nations peacekeeping
operations (Carey, 2001, p. 72). In addition to military action the United States imposed
diplomatic and economic sanctions against countries that violated human rights. In 2001
almost all of the seventy-five countries that the United States had sanctions against were
because of human rights violations (Coll, 2001, p. 126).
Clinton's actions in dealing with humanitarian situations led people to question
the existence of a Clinton Doctrine in which the United States will get involved in human
rights transgressions if they can make a difference and the costs are acceptable. When
asked about this at the end of the Kosovo conflict Clinton responded "While there may
well be a great deal of ethnic and religious conflict in the world ... whether within or
beyond the borders of a country, if the world community has the power to stop it, we
ought to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing" (Clinton, June 20, 1999, p. 1146). He
elaborated further on this when talking to U.S. troops by saying "If somebody comes
after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of their race, their ethnic
background or their religion, and it is within our power to stop it, we will stop it"
(Clinton, June 22, 1999, p. 1170). The Clinton administration's desire to intervene in
humanitarian situations is predicated on the democratic peace hypothesis in which
democracies rarely wage war on one another. This follows the Clinton administration's
belief that a world organized around stable democracies and open markets is peaceful and
in America's best interest. This also supports the opinion of Clinton and foreign affairs
scholars that the United States and other democracies can promote the spread of
democracy, human rights, and capitalism (Smith, 1994).
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United State involvement prior to the airstrikes

As a member of NATO and the United Nations numerous executive branch
officials from the United States, including President Bill Clinton, Secretary of State
Madeline Albright, National Security Advisors, and ambassadors and envoys, were
engaged in the early plans to stop the violence in Kosovo. Having been involved in
NATO operations in Bosnia the American government was paying close attention to the
actions of President Slobodan Milosevic and the violence taking place in the Kosovo
region of Yugoslavia. Even prior to the Clinton presidency the United States was aware
of problems in the area. This prompted President George Bush, in December 1992, to
issue what was to be known as the Christmas warning, which stated, "in the event of
conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to
employ military force against Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper" (Bush, 1992, p.
2207).

Different opinions in the administration

The United States was actively involved in trying to find a solution to the
problems that were worsening in Kosovo during 1998. As a member of the Contact
Group they were working with other countries to try to find a diplomatic solution that the
international community could agree to. Domestically the leaders of the Principals
Group4 met in the spring to discuss the U.S. response to the situation. During this time
Madeleine Albright was an outspoken supporter of coercive diplomacy, trying to
negotiate with Milosevic while threatening to use force if necessary (Moskowitz &
4

The Principals Committee of the National Security Council consisted of Secretary of Defense William
Cohen, Secretary of State Madeline Albright, National Security Adviser Samuel Berger and Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry Shelton.
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Lantis, 2002, p. 67). She saw the events taking place in Yugoslavia as ethnic cleansing.
This was not the position taken by other members of the national security team. National
Security Advisor Sandy Berger preferred to use diplomatic options without the threat of
force. Secretary of Defense Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Henry
Shelton provided the military perspective and argued against deploying troops to
intervene. Albright did not give up on her position and continued to try to convince allies
that immediate action was needed to avoid a repeat of Bosnia. In discussions with the
Contact Group in March Albright said,
When the war in the former Yugoslavia began in 1991, the international
community did not react with sufficient vigor and force ... Only when those
responsible paid for their actions with isolation and hardship did the war
end ... This time we must act with unity and resolve. This time, we must
respond before it is too late. (quoted in Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 28)
The White House and other national security advisors disagreed with the
approach that Albright was suggesting for various reasons. The president was in the
midst of the Monica Lewinsky scandal and some feared that the public would see any
action as a means of distracting them from this issue. Furthermore, during the spring of
1998, the level of atrocity did not warrant the use of force, there were only a few
thousand refugees and less than a hundred people killed (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, p.
30). Berger was concerned about making threats to use force without the means to follow
through and without a unified stance from the other allies. In an interview Berger
explained that "we wanted to avoid empty rhetoric as we tried to multilateralize the threat
of force." (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 30). It was not until the summer that Secretary
Cohen asked NATO to consider developing a contingency plan for military action. As a
result of Cohen's participation at the NATO defense ministers meeting NATO allies

Tipton

- 34 -

agreed to a show of force and to develop a range of options for securing peace in Kosovo.
On 15 June NATO launched Operation Determined Falcon in which more than 80
warplanes participated in a flyover within fifteen miles of the Yugoslav border with
Albania and Macedonia. This was an attempt to signal to Milosevic NATO's power in
the region (Moskowitz & Lantis, 2002, p. 69).
As part of NATO planning in the summer and fall of 1998 the discussion of
ground troops was brought to question. The White House stance was that the use of
ground forces was out of the question. United States officials told NATO planners that
the "only thing we are willing to do, and even to look at seriously, is the question of air
strikes" (quoted in Moskowitz & Lantis, 2002, p. 69). This was partly because the
memory of Somalia was still fresh in people's minds and they were not willing to risk
casualties. The military was in agreement with the White House position of not using
ground troops because Secretary Cohen and General Shelton felt that the operational
details for a ground operation were not well developed and that such a mission would be
too vague and open-ended (Gellman, 1999, p. Al). A different opinion was once again
held by the State Department with U.S envoy Richard Holbrooke and Secretary Albright
believing commitment of U.S. troops was necessary for a lasting settlement. They did
acknowledge that tensions between Congress and the Clinton administration would make
it difficult to get a commitment for ground forces (Moskowitz & Lantis, 2002, p. 71).
In October 1998 Holbrooke was sent to Belgrade to help broker a peace plan that
would enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199. He was successful in
getting Milosevic to agree to withdraw troops from Kosovo and to allow international
inspectors to verify compliance (Perlez, 1998, p. Al). To help enforce this agreement
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NATO issued an activation order (ACTORD) on 13 October giving Secretary General
Javier Solana authority to call for air strikes (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 47). In
January when inspectors discovered the massacre at Racak, the United States
administration realized that Serb forces were reneging on the October agreement and that
military strikes may be the only option to persuade Milosevic to stop the violence. The
Contact Group decided to try to force a peace settlement again. As diplomatic talks at
Rambouillet broke down in February the United States government began to prepare for
the military invasion by gathering support from the military and briefing Congress on the
possibility of air attacks in Kosovo.
As diplomatic talks were breaking down and NATO was issuing activation orders
the Pentagon continued its opposition to using force. Shelton repeatedly voiced several
reasons for resisting the move towards military action. He questioned whether the
conflict in Kosovo was an issue of national security. He also disagreed with a principal
argument that Albright was using to make the case for military coercion, because he did
not believe that the conflict would spread to other areas in the region. From a military
point of view, he thought that the air strikes would not guarantee an end to the ethnic
cleansing or that they would bring Milosevic to the negotiating table. The pentagon aiso
strongly opposed the use of ground troops because it would take too long to amass the
amount of troops that would be needed and that it would require a long-term
commitment. He continued to push for increased economic sanctions and non-diplomatic
pressure (Moskowitz & Lantis, 2002, p. 73). It was not until the middle of March that the
Joint Chiefs voted to support the air strikes.
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Differences in the international community
The United States answered questions related to international law before the
airstrikes began. The United States position was that the United Nations had dealt with
this issue in adopting three resolutions 5 imposing obligations on Yugoslavia and that
action was necessary to enforce those resolutions. They also believed that it was within
NATO's area of interest and justified the actions needed to stop the violence because the
conflict may spread to other areas in the Balkan region. While the decision to strike was
ultimately a unanimous decision within the NATO member countries there was not
unanimous support within the United Nations Security Council. China in particular
voiced opposition to the use of force in Kosovo. On 23 September 1998 the Security
Council passed Resolution 1199 that called for Serb forces to cease action against
civilians, allow for international monitoring and meaningful dialogue between the Serbs
and Kosovars, but China abstained from voting (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 42).
Because of China and Russia's threat to veto any resolution authorizing the use of force
the United States worked with NATO to obtain international authorization for the air
strikes. The decision to strike without United Nations authorization caused debate within
the international community and may have weakened the commitment of other nations.

Congressional activities related to Kosovo
The United States government is set up so that both the legislative and executive
branches share power in regards to foreign policy. Each branch would argue that they
play a key role in how the United States makes, implements and manages it's foreign
policy decisions. During the Kosovo conflict the president and the executive branch were
5

United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1160, 1199, and 1203.
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the key decision makers while Congress set the tone for domestic concerns influencing
those decisions. The decision to strike occurred just months after the House had voted to
impeach President Bill Clinton and one month after the Senate acquittal. Many members
of Congress, both Democrat and Republican were reluctant to support the president on
issues as a result of the stigma that went along with the impeachment, although the
Senate did ultimately support the decision.
Some members of Congress were pressing the president since 1998 to get
involved in what they saw as ethnic cleansing taking place in Kosovo. However, because
of domestic issues such as the congressional elections, the Monica Lewinsky scandal and
the impeachment process Congress spent little time on the issue until the prospect of
airstrikes was closer. Others questioned the United States interest in the region, the need
to involve our military in domestic issues of a sovereign nation, the risk to military
preparedness ifthe United States were to get involved, and the expense of going to war.
The strong memory of Bosnia and Somalia also caused many members to question the
role of the United States military and the ability to succeed in international humanitarian
efforts (Memories, 1999, p. 14-23).
President Clinton felt he had the authorization to act but because of the existing
tensions between the administration and Congress he consulted with members regularly
and kept them informed of developments. In the Fall of 1998 President Clinton provided
leading senators with a plan for air strikes in the event that diplomatic options were
unsuccessful. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss) responded that Congress
would not support military action, and members from both parties expressed their
disapproval of the plan (Moskowitz & Lantis, 2002, p. 71). Ultimately the Senate
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supported the president's decision to join the NATO action but a few members,
particularly in the House, questioned his authority to do so. During the diplomatic
efforts, prior to the decision to use air strikes the House voted 219-191 in March to
support a resolution (HCONRES42) that supported the deployment of 4,000 U.S. troops
to assist only in a peacekeeping operation. 6 Although the vote showed support for the
Clinton's policy it was taken despite requests from the administration to postpone the
vote until after a peace settlement had been reached. Also during this debate several
amendments were proposed. To address some concerns over the presidents ability to
send troops, Benjamin Gilman (R-NY), Chair of the International Relations Committee,
proposed an amendment that would require the Clinton administration to give Congress
the rules of engagement under which the U.S. troops would operate, a description of the
cost of the mission, and how the administration planned to pay for it as well as the
deployment's effect on military preparedness. That amendment was adopted by a voice
vote (Pomper, 1999, p. 621). To strengthen the role of Congress in making foreign
policy, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and
Chairman of the Senate European Affairs Subcommittee, Gordon Smith (R-Ore.) drafted
legislation that would tighten the economic sanctions on Serbia. (Pomper, 1999, p. 6212).
Because of the uneasiness of Congress over the prospect of airstrikes, President Clinton
met with dozens of lawmakers from 19-23 March. This helped to gain support for the
action and allow Congress to feel as if they were consulted before a decision was made.
Ultimately, the United States decision to use force against Milosevic required
balancing domestic opinions, working with Congress and assessing its role in
international security in the post-Cold War environment. By working through differences
6

Congressional Record, March 11, 1999, Hl249.
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of opinion within the administration all of the members of the foreign policy team were
able to present a unified front when talking with the media and raising public support
once the air strikes began. Congress may have put pressure on the president before and
during the conflict, but by working together Clinton was able to continue with military
action without major obstacles from the legislature. Because of the exhaustive
diplomatic process NATO members were able to begin Operation Allied Force as a
cohesive group which would serve as a justification for action despite questions within
international law. By successfully balancing these domestic issues Clinton and his
administration were able to frame the military involvement in Kosovo in a way that
continued to raise public support.

Framing Strategies
A. Initial Use ofForce.

President Bill Clinton outlined the reasons for the air strikes during his address to
the nation on the night of 24 March 1999. The statements used during this speech
became the frames that were repeated throughout the conflict. Other framers would
repeatedly refer to the reasons he offered as a justification for actions and involvement.
He said,
Our strikes have three objectives: First, to demonstrate the seriousness of
NATO's opposition to aggression and its support for peace; second, to deter
President Milosevic from continuing and escalating his attacks on helpless
civilians by imposing a price for those attacks; and third, if necessary, to
damage Serbia's capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future by
seriously diminishing its military capabilities (Clinton, March 24, 1999, p.
516).
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Clinton also set the tone by stressing the brutality and humanitarian abuses taking
place in Kosovo and attributing those actions to Milosevic. In his address to the nation,
the night airstrikes began, he created the image that Milosevic was a demon and the
Kosovar people were entirely innocent and defenseless. When discussing Milosevic he
explained that he is "the same leader who started the wars in Bosnia and Croatia," denied
the Kosovo people the "right to speak their language, run their schools, shape their daily
lives," and that Milosevic "sent his troops and police to crush them" (Clinton, March 24,
1999, p. 516). When explaining the humanitarian situation, Clinton painted a picture of
the atrocities being delivered by Milosevic by describing "shelling civilians and torching
their houses. We've seen innocent people taken from their homes, forced to kneel in the
dirt, and sprayed with bullets; Kosovar men dragged from their families, fathers and sons
together, lined up and shot in cold blood" (Clinton, March 24, 1999, p. 516). During an
exchange with reporters on 2 April 1999, Clinton described the humanitarian situation as
"grave" with one in three people being pushed from their homes. (Clinton, April 2, 1999,
p. 570). Early into the bombing campaign Clinton also emphasized the support the
operation had from the refugees.
Secretary of State Madeline Albright stood out in the Administration by making
frequent appearances in the media shortly after the air strikes began. In the first week of
the bombing Albright appeared on seven television news shows, held two press
conferences and had assistant secretaries from the State Department make four other
appearances. 7 She reiterated the reasons for being involved in Kosovo and was able to
answer questions about the background of the conflict and future plans. Most of what she

7

Information was obtained by looking at the State Department Web Site "1999 Collection Of Material On
Regional Stability, Kosovo, And Dayton Implementation"
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said built upon the information offered in Clinton's address to the nation and by doing so
reinforced the idea of a united campaign, not only within the United states administration
but also within the NATO alliance. These frequent appearances reiterated the frame that
was being used to justify the use of force. In a television interview on 26 March she says
"we have two objectives, and that is really to deter Milosevic from continuing his kind of
aggressive activities against the Kosovar people; and ifhe does not do that, then to
seriously damage his ability to continue to do so" (Albright, March 26, 1999).

Congress's Response
On the twenty-third of March, the Senate adopted a resolution (SCONRES 21 ), by
a vote of 58-41, in support of air strikes (Congressional Record, March 23, 1999, p.
S3110). Republican John Warner (R-VA), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee and Joseph Biden (D-DE), ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, introduced the resolution. The House adopted a resolution (HRES 130) on 24
March, which backed the personnel involved in the air strikes but did not debate
legislation that endorsed the attacks.
Clinton framed the decision to use force in a way that helped gain support from
both the public and Congress. Each of these groups had the ability to question his
decision and cause problems in achieving the goals of the United States administration.
By stressing the humanitarian reasons and NATO unity the public could understand the
reasons for being involved. This helped to alleviate concerns brought up by key advisors
that the American public knew little about the region or its problems (Moskowitz &
Lantis, 2002, p. 69). Clinton's frames sought to anticipate Congressional concerns and
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dealt with them up front. It also helped that members of Congress, in important
committee chair positions, were already in favor of the air strikes and could work with
the president to increase support.

Public opinion on the initial use offorce

The frames discussed above were used to influence public opinion and to convey
the administration's viewpoint of the events taking place in Kosovo. However, framing
strategies can only be successful in influencing public opinion if the public is following
the issues as they are reported in the media. According to the results of surveys
conducted throughout the conflict, 70-80 percent of respondents indicated that they were
following news stories about the NATO air strikes against Serbian forces either very
closely or fairly closely (see Table 1). There was some fluctuation in attention as the air
strikes progressed, with more people following the stories fairly closely rather than very
closely, although there remained more interest in the coverage of air strikes than other
news stories during the same period. 8
A large media campaign took place as soon as the bombing began, with President
Clinton, Secretary of State Madeline Albright, and others from the Administration
making numerous appearances on television news shows and conducting press
conferences. This helped to raise public opinion about United States involvement and to
justify its reasons for military action (see Table 2). Prior to the announcement that
airstrikes had begun only 46 percent favored the United States being part of the NATO
action. On 25 March, one day after the bombing started, the percentage of people
Other news stories asked about in this survey included efforts to reach a peace agreement with Serbia,
debates about gun control legislation in Congress and state legislatures, the crash of an American Airlines
flight in Arkansas, and accusations that China stole nuclear technology form United States laboratories.

8
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favoring military actions was up to 50 percent. During the following week, those in favor
of airstrikes rose to 53 percent. Even after the intense media blitz following the initial
use of force, favor for military action remained high. This follows the norm of
supporting military troops while they are fighting (Rourke, 1993).

Table 1. Following News Stories -NATO air strikes against Serbian Forces9
Very
Closely
June, 1999
32%
May, 1999
32
Late April, 1999 41
April, 1999
41
March, 1999
43

Fairly
Not too
Closely Closely
15
42
19
38
39
13
37
16
32
15

Not at all DK
Closely
10
1
10
1
7
0
6
0
9
1

Table 2. Support for Military Action 10
Favor Oppose No Opinion
49% 47
4
38
55
7

May 23-24, 1999
May 7-9, 1999
Chinese embassy bombing occurred on May 7, 1999
April 30-May 2, 199
58
April 26-27, 1999
56
51
April 21, 1999
April 13-14, 1999
61
April 6-7, 1999
58
March 30-31, 1999
53
50
March 25, 1999
Bombin~ began on March 24, 1999
46
March 19-21, 1999

36
40
39
35
36
41
39

6
4
10
4
6
6
11

43

11

The survey was conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. The question
repeated throughout the survey was "Now I will read a list of some stories covered by news organizations
this past month. As I read each item, tell me if you happen to follow this news story very closely, fairly
closely, not too closely, or not at all closely?"
10 These results are from Gallup Polls conducted throughout the conflict. The question asked was "As you
may know, the military alliance of Western countries called NA TO, has launched air and missile attacks
against Serbian military targets in Yugoslavia. Do you favor or oppose the United States being a part of
that military action?" The wording of the question prior to the airstrikes was "If a peace agreement is not
reached between the Yugoslavian Serbs and Kosovo's ethnic Albanian majority, NATO has said it would
carry out air and missile attacks against Serb military installations Would you favor or oppose the U.S.
being part of that military action?"
9

Tipton

- 44 -

The frame used by President Clinton to explain the United States involvement
emphasized humanitarian reasons as the foremost reason and national interest being
secondary. This was reflected in public opinion polls on 25 March with 70 percent of
respondents listing "protecting innocent civilians in Kosovo from Serbian aggression" as
a major objective (see Table 3). In his addresses to the nation, President Clinton also
provided several examples ofMilosevic's mistreatment of the Kosovars, further helping
the justify military action. In a poll taken on 30-31 March 1999 58 percent believed that
the "Serbian government had been using all means possible, including mass killing, to get
rid of all ethnic Albanians in Kosovo." 11
The data shows that the way the Clinton administration framed the issues
following the initial use of force was reflected in public opinion. The frames raised
support for the action and helped people to understand the United States' reasons for
being involved. Clinton's efforts generally appeared to succeed in shaping public
opinion in the United States.

Table 3. Reasons For Launching A Military Attack. 12

Protecting innocent civilians in Kosovo from
Serbian aggression
Protecting U.S. strategic interests in Europe
Protecting U.S. economic interests in Europe

Major
Not an
Minor
No
objective objective objective opm10n
70%
17
4
9
53
41

32
38

10
15

5

6

Gallup poll GP127287, sample size 1,078 adults,± 3%
The question asked during a Gallup poll on March 25, 1999 (GP127241, sample size 675 adults,± 4%)
was "From what you've heard or read, please say whether each of the following possible reasons for
launching a military attack against Serbian forces is a major objective of the United States, a minor
objective, or not an objective." The choices were given in random order.
11

12
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B. Response to Strike on Chinese Embassy.
On 7 May 1999 the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade was mistaken for a Serbian
military communications facility and was bombed, killing three Chinese diplomats
(Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 147). This accidental bombing was a major mistake for
NATO because it gave the public a reason to question its involvement in Kosovo,
including target selection and risks to civilians. The framers needed to convince the
public that it was unintentional and that the United States was sorry for the mistake. It
was also important to convince China that the bombing was accidental because China had
been opposed to the operation from the beginning by abstaining from voting on UNSC
Resolution 1160 and threatening to veto a resolution authorizing air strikes. The
president did not want this mistake to further damage the relationship between these two
countries. President Clinton expressed his condolences to the leader and people of China
at an exchange with reporters the morning after the bombing (Clinton, May 8, 1999, p.
854). He continued his comments by emphasizing the number of sorties that have been
flown and the relatively small numbers of civilian casualties as proof that NATO worked
hard to avoid these types of mistakes. He emphasized further the reason for being
involved by saying that "many thousands of Kosovars have been killed. There have been
rapes; they have been burned out of their homes; their records have been destroyed; and
hundreds of thousands have been turned into refugees" (Clinton, May 8, 1999, p. 854).
In remarks made on 10 May, he again highlighted the distinction between the "tragic
mistake" of the bombing of the embassy, and the "deliberate and systematic crime" of
ethnic cleansing (Clinton, May 10, 1999, p. 856). Secretary Albright also emphasized
this distinction in the letter she wrote to the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs and in
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questions received from reporters later that week. She explained "there is a huge
difference between NATO, which has done everything it can to avoid civilian casualties,
and Mr. Milosevic, whose military campaign is directed first and foremost at civilian
targets." (Albright, May 10, 1999).

Public Opinion on the Chinese Embassy Bombing
The frames used immediately following the accidental bombing of the Chinese
embassy worked to counter other stories in the media that showed anti-American protests
in China. By presenting the frame in terms of the number of missions flown and bombs
dropped it helped to emphasize the successes rather than focusing on this mistake. The
frame also helped turn the perspective from the United States by emphasizing that one
accident was better than the intentional actions of Milosevic and providing increased
justification for U.S. involvement. This message was received by the public and reflected
in a survey conducted after the bombing in which 77 percent believed the bombing was a
mistake. 13 In a different survey taken the week after the bombing 66 percent believed
that civilian casualties, and the bombing of the Chinese Embassy were unavoidable
accidents and that NATO forces were being careful to avoid these accidents. 14 The large
numbers of respondents that thought the bombing was an accident shows that the frames

13

Pew Research Center for the People and the Press survey conducted May 12-16, 1999. N=l,179 adults
nationwide. The question asked was " Some people have charged that the U.S. bombed the Chinese
Embassy in Belgrade on purpose. Other people say the bombing was just a mistake. What is your
opinion-did the U.S. bomb the Chinese Embassy on purpose, or was the bombing just a mistake?" 13
percent answered that is was bombed on purpose 77 percent responded that the bombing was a mistake and
10 percent answered that they didn't know.
14 An ABC News/Washington Post Poll conducted May 16, 1999, N=761 adults nationwide, asked the
question "As you may know, some civilians have been killed in the airstrikes against Serbia, and recently
the NATO allies bombed the Chinese consulate in Serbia's capital. Do you think that the United States and
its European allies are not being careful enough to avoid civilian casualties, or do you think these are just
unavoidable accidents of war?" 32 percent thought the allies were not being careful, 66 percent believed
they were unavoidable accidents and 2 percent had no opinion.
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used by Clinton and Albright worked to counter stories from China and those saying that
the attack was intentional.

C. Use ofgroundforces.
The discussion in the media of the use of ground forces began as soon as
President Clinton authorized the air strikes. During his address to the nation, after the
bombing began, he specifically said " I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight
a war" (Clinton, March 24, 1999, p. 517). In an exchange with reporters on 25 March,
the president was asked if the goals could be accomplished through airstrikes alone. He
stood firmly on the position that air strikes alone can limit Milosevic' s ability and make
war (Clinton, March 24, 1999, p. 519). This stance was counter to viewpoints within the
alliance, particularly Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great Britain, and was used by the
media to question the ultimate effectiveness of the airstrikes. President Clinton
explained his reasons for not wanting to send in ground troops in an interview with Dan
Rather by saying "the thing that both€:'.rs me about introducing ground troops into a hostile
situation, into Kosovo and into the Balkans, is the prospect of never being able to get
them out" (Clinton, March 31, 1999, p. 555).
When Berger was asked about the use of ground forces, at a press briefing on 25
March, he continued the frame used by President Clinton by saying that Milosevic' s
military capability can be substantially damaged by air power. 15 When further
questioned if by saying ground forces would not be introduced that Milosevic had the

15

Sandy Berger, Press Briefing by National Security Advisor, March 25, 1999, 1:50pm. Accessed from
... /Berger/990325-whl .htm
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incentive to ride out the air strikes, Berger responded that he would "sustain the most
serious damage if he thinks he can ride out an air attack."

16

The media asked Madeline Albright repeatedly about the potential use of ground
forces. On the first night of the bombing in an interview on NBC Nightly News she was
asked ifthere was a possibility that the United States will have to engage in some kind on
ground action, and she reiterated the president's position that there were "no plans to
have American ground forces in a non-permissive environment" (Albright, March 24,
1999, NBC). In another interview that same day she was asked about comments made by
General George Joulwan, former Supreme Commander of NATO forces who said that
NATO had to follow the air strikes with ground forces. In response she again reiterated
that the use of American ground forces was not part of the plan (Albright, March 24,
1999, PBS). Every other interview given the first week of the bombing asked a question
related to ground forces and each time it was answered with a definitive no. Her harshest
response to the question of ground troops came during a television interview on 28 March
when she was asked if there was no possible way the United States was going to put
American ground troops in Kosovo in a combat situation. Her response was "I am saying
what President Clinton has said and has repeated a number of times - that he has no
intention of sending ground forces into this operation" (Albright, March 28, 1999). She
follows that comment with "he says he has no intention. He is Commander-in-Chief, and
when he speaks he should be respected" (Albright, March 28, 1999).
As the conflict continued the media persisted in asking questions regarding the
use of ground forces. In an interview on 18 April Albright responded to questions by
saying that no training was specifically taking place for a ground operation (Albright,
16

Ibid.
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April 18, 1999, ABC). When asked to respond to comments that SACEUR General
Wesley Clark made to the administration saying that he cannot achieve NATO's goals
without ground troops Albright explained that she had spoken with Clark and that "he is
getting what he needs (Albright, April 18, 1999, ABC).
Prior to the NATO Summit in April, NATO began a reassessment of the use of
ground forces. When asked if this decision showed a change in the president's stance on
ground troops he explained that the update of the assessment was "wise and prudent" but
that he continued to believe that ground troops would not be necessary (Clinton, April 22,
1999, p. 706). It was also at this time that Albright explained that NATO was updating
its assessment on the use of ground forces in a permissive or non-permissive
environment; although the focus continued to be on a permissive environment and that
the assessment was part of planning (Albright, April 22, 1999). She also mentioned that
this was happening in preparation for the refugees returning home and the success of the
air campaign (Albright, April 22, 1999).
While the United States was standing firm on its position of not sending in ground
troops Great Britain was advocating their use. During interviews in late May, with
British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, Albright addressed differences between the
United States and Great Britain on the use of ground forces by stressing the mutual
agreement of the objectives and the alliance's determination to prevail (Albright, May 20,
1999).
The Clinton administration was de-emphasizing ground troops because they
wanted to be sure to limit the risks of casualties. The public would also remember
Somalia, where ground troops were killed and shown on television. Discussing the
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possible use of ground troops could also trigger Congress to become more involved since
ground troops and an extended military operation would need increased budgets.

Congress's Position on Ground Troops
In April, as air strikes continued, Congress also continued debating the use of
ground troops. In contrast to the White House the growing congressional support for at
least keeping open the option of using ground troops was reflected in a bipartisan
delegation of House and Senate members that accompanied Defense Secretary William S.
Cohen on a visit 6-8 April to NATO headquarters in Brussels and to air bases from which
U.S. forces were attacking Yugoslavia (Towell, April 10, 1999). These debates and
support came despite the fact that President Clinton and others from his administration
were unwavering on the position that ground troops would not be used to fight and would
only enter a permissive environment.
While the administration was gaining support from some members of Congress
others were using their legislative tools to oppose the policy and the president's authority.
Rep. Tom Campbell ( R-CA.) introduced two pieces oflegislation 12 April invoking the
1973 War Powers Resolution. One resolution (HCONRES82) directed the president to
withdraw troops, while another (HJRES44) declared war on Yugoslavia. When the
House International Relations Committee considered Campbell's two resolutions on 27
April, it reported each to the floor with a recommendation that it not pass.
The Senate also introduced legislation that questioned the President's actions by
calling for greater United States involvement. A resolution (SJRES20) authorizing the
president to use "all necessary force" to prevail over Milosevic, was sponsored by a
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bipartisan group led by Arizona Republican Sen. John McCain, and was intended to build
pressure on Clinton to consider the use of ground forces if the air campaign failed
(Towell, May 1, 1999, p. 1036). Another bill (S846) cosponsored by Senators Mitch
McConnell (R-KY) and Joseph I. Lieberman (D-CT), authorized the president to provide
military assistance to the Kosovo Liberation Army (Towell, April 24, 1999, p. 969).
Administration officials opposed this move, warning that it would shatter a United
Nations embargo of arms shipments to countries formerly part of Yugoslavia.
On 28 April the House voted on several pieces oflegislation related to U.S.
strategy in the Balkans. They passed HR 1569, prohibiting the use of ground forces in
Kosovo unless authorized by law, rejected with a tie vote S. Con. Res. 21 which was in
support of NATO air strikes, rejected H Con. Res. 82 which ordered a withdrawal of U.S.
forces and also rejected H.J. Res. 44 that declared war on Yugoslavia (Towell, May 1,
1999, p. 1036). These votes indicated that there was little consensus in the House on
what the policy and involvement in Kosovo should be and highlighted the partisan
differences within Congress.
Because Congress was looking at the issues surrounding the military operation in
Kosovo it was necessary for the Administration to explain its actions and reasoning in a
way that the American people can understand and relate to. By framing the issues in a
unified way, the members of the administration could gamer public support for its actions
and use that support to influence the position of Congress. With Congress unable to
convey a unified position the public was relying on the information it received from the
administration to formulate its opinion.
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Public Opinion on the Use of Ground Forces
Throughout the conflict both President Clinton and Secretary Albright held firm
on the position that United States ground forces would not be used in a non-permissive
environment and that the airstrikes alone would be enough to restrict Milosevic' s
capacity to inflict harm on the Kosovar people. This stance that ground forces would not
be used was questioned repeatedly by the media and others outside of the administration,
including the Pentagon and General Clark, who called for the need for ground forces. By
including these alternate positions in the media, the framing strategy against the use of
ground forces was not as successful as other frames. As the conflict continued the
majority of people surveyed believed that ground forces would be required for Milosevic
to comply with the peace plan (see Table 4). This was contradictory to the message
being put out by the Clinton Administration that air attacks alone would be enough to
force Milosevic to capitulate.

Table 4. Need for Ground Forces 17
April 15-18 April 8-9 April 1-2 March 25-26
Air strikes will be enough
19%
15
12
21
Ground forces will be required
65
71
60
71
16
Don't Know/Refused
14
14
19

Even though the public believed there would be a need for ground forces, surveys
showed that most respondents were opposed to their use. This public opposition helped
to strengthen arguments in Congress, against ground forces (see Table 5). The large drop
in support during late April may have been a reaction to the NATO reassessment of the
17 The question asked by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press asked "Do you think the air
strikes will be enough to make Yugoslav President Milosevic comply fully with the peace plan, or do you
think NATO ground forces will be required?"
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use of ground troops. This may explain why the Administration continued its position
despite statements from other officials. Clinton was successful in maintaining
congressional support because he continued to reject the ground troop option, thus
preventing serious opposition from being generated.

Table 5. Support for the use of ground forces. 18

May 23-24
April 26-27
April 13-14
April 6-7
March 30-31
March 25

Favor
40%
40
52
47
39
31

Oppose No Opinion
3
57
4
56
3
45
47
6
4
57
4
68

D. Influence over target selection.
For some countries there was a great deal of discussion regarding the impact the
country had on selecting the types of targets to be hit. In the United States, however,
there was little mention of targeting by leaders of the Administration in discussions with
the media. When asked about the types of targets being hit Secretary Albright would
explain the types of targets being hit then link that to the success of the overall mission.
In a television interview on 18 April, she said,
there has been a serious degradation of his military, its ability to operate.
We have hit command and control centers; his oil refineries are not
working; his ammunition supplies are down ... there is a way of wearing
down his military while at the same time our air campaign in
strengthening. (Albright, April 18, 1999)

18 Gallup polls repeatedly asked the question " If the current NATO air and missile strikes are not effective
in achieving the United States' objectives in Kosovo, would you favor or oppose President Clinton sending
U.S. ground troops into the region along with troops from other NATO countries?"
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President Clinton, would make mention of targets and justify their selection by reiterating
the goal of reducing Milosevic' military ability. In an exchange with newspaper editors
on 15 April, President Clinton explained that at the beginning of the operation target
selection focused on Serbia's air defense to reduce the risk to American pilots (Clinton,
April 15, 1999, p. 645). He then explained that with the success of that operation air
attacks can occur all day and that targets have included the military infrastructure by
hitting refineries, bridges, and communications networks. He explained that these targets
were selected to diminish Milosevic's "ability to supply, reinforce, and control its forces
in Kosovo" (Clinton, April 15, 1999, p. 645).
Target selection may not have been as important an issue for the United States
public because it was their military that was doing most of the sorties and an American,
General Wesley Clark, who commanded the operation. There was a great deal of
disagreement between the United States and the other NATO countries regarding
targeting, but those discussions took place within NATO. For other countries it was
perhaps important to show that they had some control over what was being targeted and
that United States' interest was not the only one being implemented.
Although it did not get a lot of media coverage, the president was greatly involved
in deciding how the air forces would be used during the operation. General Wesley Clark
explained that in the first few days of airstrikes the United States needed a complete
analysis of each individual target, including location, military impact, possible casualties,
possible collateral damage and risks if the weapons missed. This assessment was sent to
Washington for review and ultimately ended up on the President's desk for approval
(Clark, 2001, p. 201).
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Another American closely involved in target selection and the air operation was
Lt. General Michael Short, USAF, who served as leader of the United States joint force
air component command and NATO's southern regional allied air commander. He was
able to create operating restrictions that balanced mission accomplishment with risk to
the pilots. These included: minimum altitude of 15,000 feet above sea level, night-only
strikes, and United States only strikes near Serbia's highest threat area (Belgrade, north
of the 44th parallel).
Because little public attention in the United States was given to target selection,
and because the media did not question the strategy, framing this issue was not as critical
as in other areas. This lack of framing did serve the interests of the administration by
showing that the operation was NATO's and not just the United States. Because this was
an important issue for other countries, the public silence did not discredit what was being
said by other allies.

Evaluation ofStrategy

The public opinions polls demonstrate that the frames used by the administration
were successful in influencing how the public viewed the use of force, the Chinese
Embassy bombing, and the introduction of ground forces. The frames were able to
balance domestic pressures of public opinion and congressional influence in a way that
allowed the administration to continue its mission in Kosovo and ensure its success in the
way that it sought. The administration was able to learn from experiences they had with
other humanitarian actions and anticipate where problems may arise and created frames
that responded to them. Because the reasons given during the initial use of force were
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clear, the framers were able to rely on them as justification for later actions and convince
the public that target selection and collateral damage were necessary to succeed in the
overall mission. By having a consistent framing strategy, the Clinton administration was
able to convey their views to the public successfully. These frames and the public
support generated by the United States were contributing factors to NATO's efforts in
Operation Allied Force.
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CHAPTER 4: ITALY

Italy, perhaps more than the other countries in this study, had the most to lose and
gain in how it responded to the Kosovo conflict. The actions of Prime Minister Massimo
D' Alema's government were being watched closely by the large number of political
parties in the country, the Catholic Church and all of its international allies in the EU and
NATO. Additionally, concerns over the potential refugee problem, Italy's proximity to
the fighting, social and economic repercussions, instability in the coalition government,
and its reputation in the international community all impacted Italy's response. The
pressures exerted by each of these groups and issues forced D'Alema to balance active
participation in the military operation while aggressively pursuing diplomatic solutions.
This balance in foreign policy and international security issues has been repeated
throughout the post cold war as Italy tries to define its role in European security.

Political Environment I Background
Political Parties
Unlike other states examined in this thesis, the Italian leadership was under great
strain due to the large number of political parties in its government. During the Kosovo
crisis there were forty-six parties in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Besides the
variety of parties, in the post cold war years the make-up of the parliament was also
changing. As of December 1998 one hundred forty members of the Chamber of Deputies
and seventy-six members elected in 1996 had changed their political affiliation. The
center-left coalition government, lead by Massimo D' Alema was also made up of a large
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number of parties. The coalition consisted of the Democrats of the Left (DS), Italian
Popular Party (PPI), Union of Democrats for the Republic (UDR), DINI/Italian Renewal
Party (DINI/RI), Republican Party, Italian Democratic Socialists, Greens, Italian
Renewal and the Party ofltalian Communists (Cremasco, 2000, p. 177).
Each of these parties had different positions on Italian participation in peace
keeping operations and the use of force in international relations. The left wing of the
Communist Refoundation Party, the Party of Italian Communists and the Greens were
against military intervention, particularly if it was conducted by NATO (Cremasco, 2000,
p. 170). They supported participation in United Nations operations as long as it was not
used in a coercive manner and it had a specific humanitarian mandate. The opinions of
the left were often heard in the media throughout the conflict forcing D 'Alema to defend
his government's position. Also, except for a name change, the Democrats of the Left
(Democratici di Sinistra) were the same party that had taken a stance against the Gulf
War in 1991. They had a record of opposing domestic terrorism, which made it difficult
for them to support the tactics used by the military wing of the Kosovar nationals (Croci,
2000, p. 34).
In addition to these parties, the voices and opinions of the pacifists could be heard
throughout the conflict as well. This group was made up primarily of the Catholic
Church as well as the left wing of the former Christian Democratic Party. In the Gulf
War and in the Bosnian conflict the Catholic parties adopted an anti-interventionist stance
which they continued during Operation Allied Force. These ideological and policy
differences made the government system unstable and forced the premier to use
balancing acts to maintain cohesion of the coalition. These parties leveraged their
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positions by threatening to withdraw from the coalition if D' Alema did not implement the
course of action they suggested. Because of these opposition viewpoints the D' Alema
government needed to frame its involvement by highlighting the peace keeping and
humanitarian aspects of the operation rather than drawing attention to the military
actions.

International Security
As an original member of NATO, Italy joined the Alliance because membership
fulfilled its security and defense needs at an acceptable cost (Cremasco, 2000, p. 165).
By building a strong relationship with the United States, as part of the alliance, Italy felt
that its position would be enhanced in the Euro-Atlantic community and compensate for
instability within the domestic political system. NATO membership also offset the
presence of a strong communist party. During the Cold War, Italy was traditionally a
second tier state that could be relied on to help support NATO activities but was not
critical to decision making. Italy wanted to play a more significant role in South-Eastern
Europe, EU and NATO after the Cold War (D'Alema, 1999, p. 33-34).
In the 1980s and 1990s Italy participated in most of the peacekeeping operations
conducted by the United Nations. The use of armed forces became a central element to
its foreign policy. Italy's active involvement in Bosnia was acceptable to the public and
political parties because of the UN mandate given to NATO to deal with Bosnia.
However, unlike with Kosovo, Italy was excluded from the Contact Group and was not
part of the decision making team. Because of this exclusion Foreign Minister Susanna
Agnelli decided to deny the use of Italy's bases for missions in Bosnia by F 117 stealth
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bombers. This decision provided the leverage Italy needed and by 1996 Italy was asked
to join the group and help with the implementation of the Dayton agreement (Menotti,
2001, p. 94).
Italy's experience with international foreign policy and security during Bosnia
helped form the long-term strategy that was in place during Kosovo. The strategy
centered around the belief that NATO should remain the cornerstone of crisis and
security management in Europe, undertaking out of area operations when necessary in a
peace-supporting role. However, this role should be closely tied to specific United
Nations Security Council mandates. Another key component to Italy's foreign policy
was the belief that in order to exercise significant influence of decision making in the
alliance, Italy must be directly involved in the management of the crisis rather than
playing a reactive role (Menotti, 2001, p. 95).
Italy's participation in Kosovo was further complicated by the lack of a clear
United Nations mandate. This raised questions within the government about the legality
of the use of force. In July 1998 Foreign Minister Dini said that "an intervention by
NATO in Kosovo without a United Nations Security Council mandate was absolutely
impossible" (quoted in Croci, 2000, p. 33). This statement followed the sentiment of
some of the parties on the left who supported involvement in United Nations missions but
not NATO. Factions within the government saw this lack of United Nations mandate as
justification for continued diplomacy rather than the use of force.
D' Alema believed Italy's participation in the NATO operations was a test that
would show Italy's credibility as a reliable ally. He said "My biggest problem was
relations with the United States, how they would judge me and my government"
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(D' Alema, 1999, p. 3). This was because D' Alema was the first former communist to be
premier and throughout the cold war his party maintained close links with the Soviet
Union. Prime Minister D' Alema's party had refused to support Italy's position in the
Gulf War in 1991. During the passing of the Activation Order in October 1998 Romano
Prodi and his center-left government was still ruling, so NATO was unsure of how Italy
would respond during the actual air strikes.
To further complicate Italy's response to a NATO operation was the decision in
early March 1999 by an American military court that acquitted the American pilots
responsible for the Cermis accident in February 1998. At that time a United States navy
plane was on a training mission, and while flying at low altitudes struck a ski lift cable
causing a gondola to fall, killing all twenty people onboard (Croci, 2000, p. 48). As a
result of the court ruling the Italian government called for a review and possible renegoitiation of the treaty regulating the use of NATO's military bases in Italy, which
heightened tensions between the United States and Italy. Because these bases were
critical to the success of operations in Kosovo the United States was concerned about
Italy's loyalty to NATO but anti-NATO opposition in Italy questioned their use.
In the negotiations leading up to the decision to strike and continuing through the
conflict Italy viewed the situation in Kosovo differently from other allied countries.
Rather than laying the blame specifically on Milosevic, which was the primary framing
strategy used by the United States, Italy believed that both the Serbs and Kosovars were
responsible for the situation. They thought that a diplomatic solution was possible if one
chose to isolate the KLA, support the Rugova faction, and offer the Serbs incentives to
give back autonomy to Kosovo (Croci, 2000, p. 38). Italy supported the idea of stopping
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the flow of weapons, personnel and supplies to the KLA as incentive for the Serbs to
loosen its grip on Kosovo (Croci, 2000, p. 39). The desire for a diplomatic solution as
well as Italy's belief in shared culpability between Milosevic and the KLA caused allies
to question the Italians' commitment to a military operation. Italy was the only Allied
country to keep its embassy open in Belgrade as a way of demonstrating its willingness to
foster a diplomatic settlement.
Even though there was Allied concern over Italy's commitment, once the
operation began, Italy demonstrated its loyalty by providing the airfields from which a
majority of sorties were taking off and contributing planes and crews. NATO based
nearly half of its aircraft, about five hundred planes and helicopters at sixteen bases in
Italy. Without them, NATO's tactical air campaign would not have been as effective
(Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 149).

Refugees

Another complicating factor from the beginning was the concern about refugees
leaving Kosovo and entering Italy. This prompted Italy to be more involved in this
conflict than in other international peacekeeping operations. Italy had already received
immigrants from Albania during the post cold war period and did not want to see a large
increase in refugees. Italy originally set a limit of ten thousand refugees that it would
accept. 19 D' Alema explained that the NATO ACTORD was issued because 'the fear
existed that the situation was rapidly degenerating .. .Italy felt the emergence more than
any other country since it was in the front line of the exodus of refugees' (quoted in
Croci, 2000, p. 37). At a European Council Meeting on 22 March D' Alema and Dini
19
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requested that the European partners "not to leave Italy alone in the face of a possible
humanitarian catastrophe ... Even ifthe refugee emergency was going to be a problem
primarily for Italy, it should be treated as a European problem" 20 On 29 March, less than
a week after the airstrikes began, the government launched Operation Rainbow
(Operazione Arcobaleno); its purpose was to establish and manage refugees camps in
Albania and Macedonia. By providing facilities in areas near the Yugoslav border,
refugees would be less likely to move into Italy. Working with other international
organizations and raising private funds this project helped to shift media attention away
from military aspects and to focus on humanitarian intervention.

Other factors influencing participation
In addition to the factors related to political party divisions and international
reputations, Italy had to deal with the consequences of terrorism and social and economic
problems. Italy was the only country that experienced domestic terrorism during the
Kosovo Conflict. The Red Brigade killed Massimo D' Antona, a university professor and
government consultant on labor policy. One of the reasons the group gave for the killing
included Italy's participation in the NATO "imperialist war" (Cremasco, 2000, p. 176).
Italy also experienced social and economic repercussions from the war. Because the air
strikes took place so close to Italy, with a border only 100 miles from Kosovo and many
of the sorties taking off from Italian bases Operation Allied Force disrupted domestic air
traffic as well as commercial fishing and tourism. Bari and Brindisi, two civilian airports,
located in the south-east part ofltaly were closed during the war (Economist, April 17,
1999, p. 53). The press covered stories about fisherman who were wounded when
20
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canisters of cluster bombs were caught in their nets, which increased the public's
perception of threat.
The Italian involvement in Operation Allied Force required D' Alema to balance a
large number of domestic pressures, historic legacies and international concerns. The
multiple political parties, the legacy left behind from the Gulf War and Bosnia, tensions
with the United States, social and economic disruptions, the potential problem with
refugees and the influence of the Catholic Church all made it difficult for the Italian
government to present a unified stance in its involvement in the operation. By working
with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lamberto Dini, and the Under-Secretary of State,
Umberto Ranieri, Prime Minister D' Alema was able to overcome these political
challenges. Together this group developed framing strategies that helped placate the
issues of all concerned and allowed Italy to participate in the military operation.

Framing Strategies
A. Use ofForce.
D' Alema was able to balance the domestic pressures by framing the issues in a
way that allowed him to demonstrate that Italy was fully participating in NATO operation
and at the same time making proposals calling for peace settlements and a return to
international legality (Kostakos, 2000, p. 175). The frames used were directed to the
public, to political parties within the Italian government and externally to the
international community. Throughout the conflict the government downplayed the
military aspects of participation and emphasized the humanitarian actions being taken as
well as efforts to find ways to bring Milosevic back to diplomatic negotiations.
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To help sway domestic opposition to military involvement the government framed
the use of force as a necessity to ending the humanitarian problems in Kosovo and as its
responsibility as a NATO member. Prior to the initial use of force D' Alema explained
that in issuing the ACTORD NATO was hoping ''to show Milosevic a loaded gun in
order to convince him to negotiate" and that the alliance "looked to the Bosnian
precedent when limited air raids had brought him to the negotiating table" (quoted in
Croci, 2000, p. 38). Foreign Minister Dini also explained "Italy is part of the alliance and
cannot therefore renege on its responsibilities. Fifteen members were in favor of
intervention: to dissociate ourselves would have been a pretty dramatic gesture" (quoted
in Croci, 2000, p. 39).
On the day the bombings began frames were used to appeal to the public's
concerns over humanitarian abuses and the plight of the refugees. In an article by
Umberto Ranieri on the day the bombings began he explained that
Serbian security forces are engaging in total rampage. The figures are
alarming. According to the latest data from the UN agency for refugees,
there are 250,000 displaced persons within Kosovo .... Th,is is the dramatic
backdrop against which the events in Kosovo are now drawing to a close.
(quoted in L'Unita 24 March 1999)
This frame was consistent with that used by other NATO countries to gain public support
in which they emphasized the conditions being inflicted on the Kosovars by the Serbs.
D 'Alema was aware of opinions within his own coalition and among other
political parties that more effort should have been made in finding a diplomatic solution
rather than resorting to military force. To show that he had not abandoned the idea of
negotiating D' Alema expressed the view that the bombing was succeeding in its objective
of threatening Milosevic. At an EU Summit meeting, on March 25, days after the air
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strikes began, he said that "The time to hand matters over to politics and diplomacy is
approaching" (quoted in Collura, March 26, 1999, 1). This made NATO allies question
the commitment that Italy had toward continuing the operation. Sandy Berger, U.S.
National Security Advisor, contested D' Alema's military evaluation and the United
States and Great Britian asked for clarification because they felt D' Alema's statement
weakened the coalition and sent a misleading message to Milosevic (Cremasco, 2000, p.
172). However, D' Alema's statement was likely a way to appease domestic concerns
before a parliamentary vote was taken the next day, by demonstrating his desire for
diplomacy.
On 26 March parliament voted (318 to 188) on Italy's position toward the war.
The motion was written in a way that the communists, who were threatening to leave the
coalition, and D' Alema could accept. It called for an end of the air attacks as soon as
possible and for diplomatic initiatives to be pursued immediately as well as insisting that
the Italian forces not participate directly in the air operation (Croci, 2000, p. 42). The
,.

motion did allow for Italy to continue its participation and support of NATO during the
operation. Democrats of the Left member of parliament, Michele Salvati, explained his
party's position by saying,
Even ifl regard NATO's choice as wrong, and the prelude to even
bigger problems down the road, I do not think that we face one of those
extreme situations in which we are morally compelled to disregard such
important issues as that of national interest and loyalty to an alliance
upon which our security and role in Europe depend. Hence, it follows
that full and unconditional respect for NATO decisions is for us an
obligation we cannot evade. 2
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Throughout the conflict political parties continued to voice concerns over Italy's
involvement in Operation Allied Force. Government leaders were careful to frame their
responses to the parties in order to maximize support and mollify contentions. An
example of this framing strategy can be seen in Foreign Minister Dini's address to the
Foreign and Defence Commissions of the Senate and House of Deputies when he
explained that
The government has set itself a triple objective: a) of persevering with the
military action undertaken in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, in
the aim of diminishing Belgrade's repression machine; b) of organizing
relief operations for the refugees who are currently crossing Kosovar
borders by the thousands, especially into Albania; c) of continuing to
pursue a political solution which, even though today we seem almost at a
loss to achieve it, must imperatively remain the rationale behind the use of
force. (Dini, March 31, 1999)

This statement reiterated Italy's involvement in a way that addressed all concerns:
responsibility to the Alliance, humanitarian measures, and diplomatic efforts. In
justifying why NATO action will continue Dini described reports of "massacres verging
on genocide .. .intolerable barbarism that goes against the grain of any civilised
conscience ... killings of intellectuals, writers and of anything and anyone that fuelled the
culture and identity of the Kosovar Albanians" (Dini, March 31, 1999). This statement
further emphasized the reasons for involvement in order to help persuade the opposition
to support Italy's involvement while pointing out efforts being made to stop the fighting.
In April the Party of Italian Communists and the Greens asked the government to
distance its policy from NATO's and to demand a bombing pause over Easter,
threatening to leave the coalition if it did not happen. The Vatican was also seeking an
Easter truce. Jean Louis Tauran, the Vatican's chief foreign affairs official, met with
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President Milosevic in early April to deliver a message from the Pope. During this
meeting he called for a cease fire over Easter to enable humanitarian organizations to
return and peace talks to resume. In a statement Tauran said "the ceasing of all military
action during the week between the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Easter would be a
gesture of great humanity" (Agence France Presse, April 1, 1999). This call for a cease
fire prompted political parties, trade unions and peace groups to demonstrate in Rome to
show their support (Agence France Presse, April 3, 1999). In response, D' Alema
explained that Italy was committed to finding a peaceful solution but that Italy was fully
committed to NATO operations. D' Alema reiterated in a newspaper interview that there
was firm support of the NATO air campaign and that he would not be the first premier to
endorse the reduction ofltaly's role in NATO (La Stampa, April 1, 1999).
Because the government was trying to address a variety of international and
domestic demands, different messages were often presented by Foreign Minister Dini and
Premier D' Alema. For example, in April at a meeting of EU foreign ministers Dini
declared that Italy did not want to see the bombing go on for much longer and urged
NATO countries to develop an exit strategy. D' Alema explained this difference of
opinion among his government by saying that there was an understanding between all
those involved that the government would perform its duties while political forces were
free to act as they wanted, even if it was contradictory to the government's position. The
government would take them into consideration in the framework of its primary
responsibilities and commitments (D' Alema, 1999, p. 34-35). In framing issues
regarding the Kosovo conflict Prime Minister D' Alema would present the NATO
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position and Foreign Minister Dini would present the opposition viewpoint. This often
made the press view Dini as pro Serbian.
This division of roles between Dini and D' Alema helped the government to
recognize the opposing viewpoints and allow it to continue its mission, although it did
give the Allies the appearance of a lack of political cohesion. This was evident when
Dini appeared to question NATO's position during an interview when he said,
the intensification of the bombing is no guarantee of its success, despite
statements form the military spokesman. We must pose the problem of
the moral and political impact that these attacks are having not only in
Serbia and Kosov, but within NATO too. In other words, ifthe Alliances'
declared objectives are not met, we cannot go on bombing forever. We
must find an immediate way of alleviating the condition of the Koso var
Albanians and of aiding the refugees. (Corriere della Sera, April 4, 1999)

Despite all of the pressures and varied opinions D' Alema was able to frame
Italy's involvement in a way that addressed all of the concerns. He focused attention on
the humanitarian crisis, rather than military operations, developed a program that
highlighted Italy's role in addressing the refugee problem, and continued to look for ways
to return Milosevic to negotiations. Although these actions often caused the Allies to
question Italy's commitment to Operation Allied Force they worked to balance domestic
pressures with NATO responsibility.

Public Opinion on the Use of Force
Because there were so many varied opinions among the Italians, and because it
was difficult for the government to present a unified framing strategy, public opinion also
showed varying levels of support for the use of force. The differences in public opinion
mirrored the different opinions voiced by the government. On 23 March a survey found
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that 68 percent favored further diplomatic efforts while 27 percent felt that more drastic
measures were needed to convince Milosevic to end the oppression (Isemia, 2001, p.
102). On 26 March, just two days after the airstrikes began, 72 percent were in favor of
returning to diplomatic efforts and only 22 percent supported continuing the airstrikes
until Milosevic signs a peace agreement. In another poll conducted two days after the
start of the NATO campaign 25 percent of the respondents considered the attacks
justified and 50 percent felt they were unjustified because there was still time to negotiate
(Cremasco, 2000, p. 170). Another poll conducted at the same time supports this finding
when it found 37 percent supporting and 49 percent opposing NATO airstrikes against
Serbia. At the beginning of April support for NATO intervention rose to over 31 percent.
The shift could have resulted from D' Alema's insistence on the gravity of the situation in
his television address on 30 March. In May, following NATO errors and increased
numbers of civilian casualties, support dropped by seven percent. 22 Looking at surveys
conducted throughout the conflict, the average results showed only 44 percent favored
NATO bombing and 45 percent opposed it (Isemia, 2001, p. 101). These polls reflect the
opinion that further diplomacy was necessary before military action was taken.
One way the Italian government justified its actions was to frame it as a NATO
responsibility and that they had little choice but to cooperate or risk their position in the
international security arena. The success of that frame was shown in a number of polls
taken near the beginning of the airstrikes. When a follow-up question was asked in the
23 March survey in order to gauge support if NATO did decide to strike, 49 percent
thought that Italy should support NATO while 33 percent felt Italy should oppose the
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operation (Isemia, 2001, p. 102). The 26 March survey found that only 38 percent
believed NATO should be uncritically supported, 29 percent felt that Italy should be
critical of NATO operations and 18 percent opposing the NATO decision to use force
(Isemia, 2001, p. 102). However, on 29 March those who thought that NATO should be
supported rose to 52 percent. This increase was due mainly to those with previously no
opinion. The numbers of those who thought Italy should be critical of NATO, 27
percent, and those who opposed NATO policy, 14 percent, stayed near the same levels as
earlier (Isernia, 2001, p. 102).
While public opinion on the use of force and NATO participation mirrored the
various viewpoints of political parties, the public successfully understood the frames
explaining why Italy was involved in the conflict. The Italians understood the reasons
behind NATO's military operation when a survey asking about the motivation behind the
attacks against Serbia was conducted in late March. Thirty-six percent listed stopping the
massacres in Kosovo, 27 percent answered toppling the Milosevic regime and 19 percent
believed it was to push the Serbs into negotiations (Isernia, 2001, p. 103). These were the
reasons that both Dini and D 'Alema gave in their speeches when the airstrikes began. In
another poll, 65 percent agreed with the statement that 'the decision to bomb Serbia is
needed to stop repression in Kosovo' (Isemia, 2001, p. 103).
The frames used by the government to justify Italy's participation in the use of
force were created to acknowledge an understanding of the opposition viewpoints and not
necessarily to increase or change public opinion. Because party differences remained,
public support continued to be divided as well. There was never a time when the
government had a majority of support in favor of using force. This was different from
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the United States because a consistent frame was being presented by the Administration
as a means of gaining public support.
The frame that was the most successful in Italy was the references to its obligation
to NATO. While there was not the rally around the flag effect that was seen in the
United States there does appear to be a rally around NATO. The consistently high
numbers of people believing that Italy should support NATO compared to the numbers
who support involvement, demonstrates that the public, like the pru1ies of the coalition
government, were trying to find a way to reconcile personal beliefs with national security
interests.

B. Response

to Strike on Chinese Embassy.

- The NATO bombing of the Chinese Emba-.5sy in Belgrade fueled debates over
targeting mishaps and civilian losses, which jeopardized the stability of D' Alema's
government. Jhe increased incidents of targeting error and the number of civilian
casualties strengthened the anti-war movement. There were increased demonstrations
near Italian air bases, particularly Aviano, the home base of the American air fleet. The
C( 'ari1:.inist Refoundation Party and other pacifist groups c"lled foi the day long protest,

ia which 4,000 people demonstrated with anti-NATO signs and called for politicians to
use diplomacy to find a peace settlement. (EFE News Service, May 10, 1999)
As the public became more vocal in its opposition, the governmentneeded to
fraine itS responses to military mistakes in a way that continued to explain Italy's
involvement and highlighted attempts at diplOmricy. Italy understood the critical role that
Chiria played in bringing an end to the military situation. In a press release issued the day
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after the bombing, the Farnesina expressed regret for the bombs that fell on the Embassy.
Then stressed the importance of China playing a part in the political solution to the
conflict as outlined during the G8 meeting. (Press release May 8, 1999) Unlike the
United States this press release did not try to justify the bombing or compare it to
Milosevic' s crimes.
Under-Secretary of State Ranieri, however, did emulate the United States'
position when he said,
All we can do ... is to express our deepest regrets and sorrow for both for
the bombing of a civilian area of the city ofNis and for the victims and the
damage caused to the Chinese embassy in Belgrade ... Knowing that
NATO did not ... purposefully attack the Chinese diplomatic office does
nothing to lessen our consternation or attenuate our distress. (Ranieri, May
10, 1999)

He also explained that the use of force carries with it the risk to civilians and
accidental bombings. He used this point to further the Italian frame of diplomatic efforts
by saying "It is for this reason that the Italian government has been committed from the
outset, and with particular energy, to supporting any quest for diplomatic solution that
could put an end to the use of force as quickly as possible."
Each of these statements supported the NATO action, however, Italian President
Oscar Luigi Scalfaro said that the bombing, "has moved from the military to the civilian
sector" and suggested that "European allies have been too compliant in accepting U.S.
leadership of the air campaign." (Drozdiak, May 11, 1999, p. A16)
For Italy, the Chinese Embassy bombing came at a critical time. It saw its role as
a facilitator of peace being jeopardized by this mistake. Italy had been working with the
G8 and the Security Council to develop a peace plan that was dependent on Chinese
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support. Italy chose to frame its response to this situation by emphasizing the importance
of China in bringing peace rather than drawing more attention to the military operation.
Even though this accident precipitated protests the frames were primarily geared to the
Chinese and NATO allies rather than to the public. The success of these frames were
seen a few days after the bombing when German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder traveled
to China and was reassured that China would continue to be involved in bringing about a
peaceful settlement within the United Nations and G8.

C. Use ofground forces.

Italy, like other NATO countries, was cautious in mentioning the possible use of
ground forces. With public opinion about the air war divided, the Italian government
needed to keep discussions about ground forces from strengthening the opposition's
arguments. Although members of the Italian government used different framing
strategies in justifying the use of force there was consistency in denying the use of
ground forces as part of the military operation. On 30 March 1999 the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs issued a press release that said "no ground strikes in Kosovo are
envisaged in the context of NATO operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." In
an interview on April 1 Dini explained that,
NATO has till now rejected the idea of sending in ground troops to allow
civilians in Kosovo to return to safety. It is a hypothesis that goes beyond
the scope of the programmes drawn up by the Allies and one which would
radically modify the nature of the conflict. (Il Giomale, 1 April 1999)
In another interview on 4 April Dini was again asked about the possible use of
ground forces and his response was,
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To organize the introduction of ground troops under hostile conditions
would take months. What is more, a ground campaign would amount to a
veritable invasion, with unforeseeable consequences. The Italian
government has not considered this hypothesis, which in fact does not
figure on the plans discussed by NATO so far. (Corriere della Sera, 4
April 1999)
In an interview on 13 April after the Brussels summit Dini further iterated the fact that
"There are no plans or intentions to dispatch ground troops in Kosovo for military
purposes; there is, in addition, no need to reconsider this decision." (L'Unita, 13 April
1999)
Mr. D' Alema also addressed the issue of ground troops at a press conference in
late April, after meeting with United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan. He
explained that the two did not talk about ground forces because "it is not one of the things
we're going to take a decision on, so it would be useless to create the idea of some nonexistent conflict about a non-existent issue at a time when we must show the utmost
solidarity and cohesion with NATO." 23 This signaled to both the Italian public and to the
NATO Allies that ground forces were not going to be used and that D' Alema was not
doing anything to go against the plans of the Allies.
Despite the repeated message that ground troops would not be used one hundred
seventy Chamber and Senate members of the governing coalition signed an appeal to
D' Alema, on 22 April, that in the event of a land war, they would withdraw their support
of the government (Casadio, April 23, 1999, p. 10). This indicates that the frame was not
successful in convincing the members of parliament that ground troops would not be
used.
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Only after the airstrikes continued did the .government leaders begin voicing
differing opinions on the use of ground forces. In late May, Dini discussed the possibility
of using ground forces in a land war and warned that it would destroy twenty years of
political and diplomatic work and that if it were the case, Italy would be forced to
dissociate itself from NATO. D'Alema countered Dini's statements by saying that Italy
would be totally loyal to NATO. This followed the pattern in which Dini would vocalize
support for the domestic position while D' Alema conveyed Italy's commitment to NATO
and the wishes of the Alliance.
Not until after the G8 plan was developed and a resolution was being worked out
by the Security Council did Umberto Ranieri acknowledge the possibility of ground
troops by saying that
Only if faced with a refusal from Belgrade to respect a resolution adopted
by the Security Council will the United Nations have to consider
authorizing a ground campaign." "If that happens it would be a decision
taken by the United Nations Security Council that would bind the whole
international community. It would be a totally different picture. (11
Mattino, 29 May 1999)

Public Opinion on the Use of Ground Forces

Although the government was clear and consistent in its stance against the use of
Italian ground troops, during most of the conflict, public opinion on the issue changed as
the military operation went on. A poll on 26-28 March asked about sending NATO
ground troops to stop the fighting between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs and found that
53 percent supported their use and 41percent were opposed. When asked the same
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question again on 15-18 April responses showed only 33 percent supported for the use of
ground troops and 58 percent opposed. 24
An Angus Reid Poll from 22-25 April 1999 asked the question "Now if there's no
settlement to end the war in Kosovo, would you support or oppose NATO sending
ground troops in to fight against Yugoslav forces?" The results showed that 15 percent
strongly support, 18 percent somewhat support, 23 percent somewhat oppose, 40 percent
strongly oppose and 3 percent did not know. 25
On April 7 a survey found that 34 percent wanted NATO to continue the bombing
until Milosevic signed a peace agreement, 33 percent favored a ground operation, 33
percent were in favor of Italian participation in a NATO ground operation, and 29 percent
were in favor of the use of ground forces even in the event of casualties of Italian soldiers
(Isemia, 2001, p. 104). This support for ground troops rose in late May when a survey
found that 42 percent favored sending Italian ground troops if NATO decided to send in
troops if Milosevic did not stop the humanitarian abuses (lsemia, 2001, p. 103). These
results again demonstrate the Italian public's loyalty to NATO and reflected D' Alema's
framing strategy.
The frame presented by D' Alema reflected that of NATO. It said that ground
troops would not be used but if NATO did decide to use them Italy would be supportive.
Dini' s frame was a closer reflection of opposition party opinion because he held firm in
opposing their use even with NATO approval. Public opinion on the use of ground
troops, like other issues, demonstrates how the public reconciled its opposition to the war
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with support for NATO. The polls show that even though there was opposition to the use
of ground forces, if NATO used them then Italy should participate.

D. Irifl,uence over target selection.
In discussions about target selection, Italy had to be careful once again to balance
its military involvement with its push for diplomacy. The government chose to downplay
participation in any military aspects of the intervention, and chose to emphasize the
humanitarian action instead.
There were questions raised about NATO's overall strategy and whether the air
tactic would meet the goals of the operation. The Vatican questioned the likelihood of
success when the Pope asked, "Is it possible to protect a threatened population form an
altitude of 50,000 meters? Does protecting the Kosovars' legitimate aspirations justify
the destruction of the whole of Serbia?" (Tauran, 2000, 248).
Italy backed the decision to escalate the air war and to target political and military
facilities in Belgrade (Cremasco, 2000, p. 172). On 9 April Dini delivered an address to
the Foreign and Defence Commissions in which he explained the targets and weapons
being used.
With the escalation that has taken place ... and with the introduction of
highly sophisticated anti-tank helicopters close to Kosovo, NATO screens
are beginning to pick out the combat units, with armoured vehicles, the
troops and the military command behind which Milosevic is stubbornly
making his moves ... Ever heavier and more devastatin~ bombings are
visibly wearing down the Yugoslav military potential. 6
He immediately followed this up by reiterating the importance of diplomacy when he
said "These military operations, the humanitarian emergency and the determination of the

26

At http://www.esteri.it/eng/archives/arch-press/speeches/april99/d090499e.htm

Tipton

- 79-

Alliance do not signify that we have abandoned hopes of peace .... Agreeing that war was
necessary does not imply negating the prospect of peace.'.27 This frame helped to stress
NATO's involvement and not specifically Italy's.
Although Italy had supported the targeting of military installations they strongly
objected to targeting the Serbian television headquarters and expressed concern about
bombing the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade (Cremasco, 2000, p. 174). This issues caused
the leadership to once again present different frames. On 23 April Dini criticized
NATO's decision to bomb the Serbian television building but D'Alema contradicted that
statement by presenting the view that while politicians are responsible for establishing the
broad parameters of legitimate targets they should not discuss or question every target
(Croci, 2000, p. 43). This again demonstrated how D' Alema was framing issues to
reflect well on NATO while Dini could frame comments in support of the opposition's
positions.
As the end of the war approached Dini was questioned in an interview about
ending the air raids. He said that
the bombing will stop when the Serbs begin to withdraw from
Kosovo ... from now on there will be no more bombing outside of
Kosovo ... and that in particular there will be no more strikes on urban
centers or against civilian structures ....Not to suspend the strikes would be
unjustifiable given the agreement that has been reached in Belgrade ...
(Molinari, June 4, 1999)

To the public, Dini and D' Alema were taking a hands off approach to targeting.
They chose to emphasize NATO's decisions regarding target selection and downplayed
their own involvement in decision-making. In choosing this framing strategy it protected
them against the opposition's critiques of what was being hit. It also allowed them to
27

Ibid.

Tipton

- 80 -

underscore their responsibility to NATO and not publicly condemn decisions being made
by other NATO allies.

Evaluation ofStrategy

It is difficult to say whether the frames used by the Italian government were
successful in influencing public opinion because most were geared primarily at the
opposition views of political party members and the international community rather than
directly to the public. The frames were successful, however, in balancing the domestic
pressure placed on the governmental coalition by its own members. Despite various
threats to withdraw support and to bring down the coalition it remained stable throughout
the conflict. By framing participation as a duty to NATO and to help with humanitarian
relief the Italian government was successful in placating some of the oppositions
concerns. The government also used opportunities to remind the public that major efforts
were being made to put an end to the war by finding ways to induce Milosevic back to
the negotiating table. By allowing Foreign Minister Dini to frame issues differently from
Prime Minister D' Alema the government could provide a voice and response to the
groups opposing Italy's involvement.
Because of the success of these frames Italy was able to establish a strong
international presence in Operation Allied Force by participating in the Contact Group,
allowing NATO planes to use its military bases, securing the departure of Kosovo leader,
Ibrahim Rugova, and in leading the way in helping the refugees. The framing strategies
used by D' Alema in showing the international community that Italy was committed to
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NATO and this operation strengthened its success. Despite international concerns over
comments made by members of the government, Prime Minister D' Alema was able to
present his strong stance on participating and countered the apprehension expressed by
others. This allowed D' Alema to pass the personal and national test by showing support
with conviction and enthusiasm despite domestic pressures (Croci, 2000, p. 41 ).
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CHAPTERS: GERMANY

Germany, much like Italy, developed a dual strategy for dealing with the Kosovo
conflict. They needed to support the Allied efforts and push diplomatic initiatives in
order to reconcile pressures from within NATO with pressures from domestic political
parties. With a new government taking office as the conflict escalated, Germany had to
quickly develop a position on the Kosovo situation and find its place in the international
community. The decision to participate was influenced by historical contrition, regional
interests in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, domestic political party pressures and
opinions of the international community.

Political Environment I Background

Throughout much of the cold war Germany held a low profile in NATO in order
to avoid reawakening memories of the Third Reich. After the Cold War the United States
encouraged Germany to play a more prominent role in the alliance. (National Journal,
May 1, 1999, 1180) This meant overcoming the guilt associated with World War II. The
main features of German political-military culture after 1945 were ingrained in
antimilitarism, multilateralism, and a commitment to human rights (Rudolf, 2000, p.
131). During the Kosovo conflict each of these came in direct conflict with the others.

Political Parties

After the Cold War German political parties had to develop or rethink their own
security policies. The parties that favored the NATO framework, the creation of the
European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the extension of aid
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to Eastern Europe included the Christian Democrat Union-Christian Socialist Union
(CDU-CSU) and the Free Democrats (FD). The CDU-CSU backed the use of force
outside of Germany and the NATO area if it was under NATO auspices, but the Social
Democrats (SPD) felt this should only be done under the United Nations (Whiteneck,
2001, p. 39).

The Greens historically supported the ideas of peace. At their 1993 party

convention they voted to oppose the use of force of any kind in Bosnia. In 1994 the
platform of the Greens/Alliance 90 and Party of Democratic Socialists (PDS), formerly
the East German Communist Party, called for the disbanding of NATO, an end to
compulsory military service, unilateral German disarmament, and reliance on collective
security within the UN and OSCE (Whiteneck, 2001, p. 41). The stance of the Greens
and Social Democrats would be brought into question when deciding on participation in
Operation Allied Force.

Foreign policy and military intervention in the 1990s

Germany played a key role in the breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s by
taking a strong stance in support of formal recognition for Croatia and Slovenia. While
the European Community was working on ways to establish peace in the country and
keep Yugoslavia together, Germany threatened to unilaterally recognize the two states
(Steinberg, 1993, p. 37) despite warnings that recognition could trigger a war in Bosnia
(Holbrook, 1998, p.31 ). Giving in to German pressure, the EC agreed to recognize
Slovenia and Croatia on 15 January 1992, in order to maintain unity within the EC.
In the post-Cold War era, Germany was hesitant to get involved in any military
operation. For many Germans war was equated with doing something wrong. They had
refused to participate in the1991 Gulf War. In 1993-1994 Germany sent troops to

Tipton

- 84 -

Somalia to participate in UN peacekeeping operations. Their greatest military
involvement prior to Kosovo was in Bosnia. The AWAC units were assigned to enforce
the no-fly-zone. In December 1994 the SPD and Green parties voiced opposition to the
deployment of Tornado fighter bombers in Bosnia. The SPD chair Rudolf Scharping
argued that the aerial surveillance contradicted the UN commitment to provide
humanitarian assistance but Bonn eventually gave its consent (Maull, 2000, p. 58). By
1996 Germany was fully integrated into IFOR and sent 4,000 troops to provide noncombat logistic and medical support (Ramet & Coffin, 2001, p. 54). This experience of
responding to humanitarian situations caused by Milosevic and participating in
international humanitarian interventions made it easier for Germany to decide to
participate in the Kosovo mission.

Historical involvement in Kosovo under the Kohl government
In 1997, when Kosovo was becoming an issue in the international community,
Chancellor Helmet Kohl avoided acting alone and rooted his response in the multilateral
frameworks of the Contact Group, the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy and
NATO. He was following Germany's traditional approach of multilateralism when
dealing with foreign policy. In the fall of 1997, Germany and France undertook a joint
diplomatic initiative by having Germany's Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and France's
Herbert V edrine send a letter to the Serbian president asking for a negotiated solution and
indicating that the EU might reciprocate by restoring trade preferences (Rudolf, 2000, p.
132). Foreign Minister Kinkel supported the policy of threatening Milosevic but insisted
on a United Nations Security Council mandate. He thought that without the mandate it
would lead to conflict with the opposition parties of the SPD and Greens. Those parties
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felt that the use of military force for anything other than collective defense under Article
5 of the NATO treaty required a UN mandate. By the time the conflict escalated to the
use of force only a few SPD members changed their position on this. The most notable
was Defense Minister, Rudolf Scharping (Rudolf, 2000, p. 133).
In the time leading up to the decision to use force, the United States was actively
involved in the shuttle diplomacy. Germany's role centered on getting Russian support to
prevent a United Nations Security Council veto (Rudolf, 2000, p. 133). During the
diplomatic efforts of the Contact Group, U.S. Defense Secretary Cohen and Secretary of
State Albright did not think it was necessary to obtain UN authorization to strike.
Foreign Minister Kinkel emphasized the "unassailable legitimacy" that a UN mandate
would offer to the NATO operation. However, Defense Minister Ruhe and SPD fraction
chief Scharping agreed with Cohen and Albright. They were all concerned that referring
the question to the UN would be more damaging, because Russia would veto the
proposal, which may lead other countries to withdraw their support, preventing NATO
from reacting and the allowing the violence in Kosovo to continue (Focus, June 22, 1998,
p. 30).

Kosovo involvement under the Schroder Government
With the fall 1998 elections, the new government decided to follow the path
established by the Kohl government, and went against their long held beliefs about the
use of force rather than underscore NATO's credibility by refusing to participate (Rudolf,
2000, p. 133). The newly elected Schroder government, made up of a coalition ofSPD
and Greens, were strongly committed to human rights. The Green Party, was known for
its pacifist stance, but the issues involved in the Kosovo crisis made it difficult to support
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both of their foreign policy principals: a rejection of the use of force and a strong
humanitarian commitment. The foreign minister of the new coalition government,
Joschka Fischer, was a member of the Green Party, consequently there was strong Green
sentiment conveyed within the coalition.
Gerhard Schroder also wanted to avoid the impression that Germany was
pursuing a separate path from the Western Allies. The treaty of the new coalition
promised to work toward the preservation of the 'monopoly of force of the United
Nations' (Rudolf, 2000, p. 134). The coalition started with a foreign policy program
oriented toward non-military conflict management, reinforcement of the OSCE and
reforms for the United Nations (Duke, Ehrart, & Karadi, 2000, p. 133). These programs
were supplanted by the Kosovo conflict.
Chancellor Schroder wanted to avoid the impression that Germany, under the new
government would be unreliable. Before taking office he met with President Clinton to
assure him that Germany would support military action against Yugoslavia, but that a
final decision regarding the extent of their role would have to wait until after he took
office. Despite this assurance the Clinton Administration began pressing the new
government for a decision regarding participation just three days after that meeting. This
urgency came because of pressure from Defense Minister Volker Rueke who wanted
Washington to solidify the new government's plans for participation and because of
worries by Richard Holbrook that Milosevic would see Germany as a weak spot and not
take the NATO threat seriously (Rudolf, 2000, p. 133).
Schroder had little choice but to endorse the threat of force in order to appear to
be a reliable ally. The United States structured the decision-making process in a way that
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left German policy makers little choice but to agree to threaten the use of force. If
Germany had refused, it could have been blamed for the failure of Holbrook's negotiating
mission, which would have lead to a loss of image and influence in international
relations. The newly elected government did not.want to be blamed for the failure of
coercive diplomacy that was agreed to in principal under the Kohl government (Rudolf,
2000, p. 131-133).
On 16 October 1998, the Bundestag voted (500 to 62) on the use of Tornado
aircraft participation. This showed Germany's reliability as an ally and its support in
maintaining pressure on Milosevic. Most of the Green party voted to authorize this
participation in the airstrikes in order to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. The
majority of the dissenting vote came from the Party of Democratic Socialism, based in
East Germany (Rudolf, 2000, p. 133-134). This vote provided the legal basis for
Germany's participation in the future use of force. Top politicians from both the old and
new governments were quick to acknowledge that any involvement in Kosovo would not
be a precedent and that future involvement elsewhere would be on a case basis (Duke,
Ehrart, & Karadi, 2000, p. 133). On 19 November 1998 the Bundestag voted for
participation in the NATO Extraction Force in Macedonia and on 25 February 1999,
hoping for an optimistic result at Rambouillet, voted to include German soldiers as
members of a post-crisis stabilization force. (Duke, Ehrart, & Karadi, 2000, p. 133).

Refugees
In addition to concerns over human rights abuses taking place in Kosovo,
Germany was also interested in regional stability and reducing the number of refugees
coming into the country. During the Bosnian crisis Germany accepted 32,000 refugees.
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Germany tried to find a multilateral solution to the refugee problem by working within
the EU and proposing quotas for Western European states, but the idea did not pass
because it lacked the support of France and Great Britain (Ramet & Coffin, 2001, p. 56).
Germany was again concerned about the large numbers of people being displaced by the
Serbian attacks in Kosovo. Ultimately, Germany agreed to accept 10,000 refugees from
Kosovo. (National Journal, May 1, 1999, p. 1180).

Germany's role in settling the conflict
In terms of logistical measurements, Germany played a small, but important role
in the military operation. They provided fourteen Tornado aircraft equipped with
Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) capability. They were the only allied
country, besides the United States, that owned planes equipped with this capability. They
flew on forty-six reconnaissance missions and three hundred ninety-four sorties, firing
two hundred forty-four antiradiation missiles (Rudolf, 2000, p. 138).
Germany held significant power in the international community during this time
because in addition to being a member of NATO it held the presidency of the European
Union, the Western European Union and the G8. This helped it to play a central role in
political crisis management and allowed them to easily share ideas about diplomatic
solutions to the war (Duke, Ehrart, & Karadi, 2000, p. 134).
The most important role that Germany played in Operation Allied Force was the
development of a peace plan, that ultimately was used to bring an end to the conflict. The
plan showed a twofold strategy for ending the war. It provided continued support for the
Allies to pressure Milosevic, and averted the impression that Germany was a weak link in
the alliance. It also opened new diplomatic efforts to end the fighting by including
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Russia and the United Nations, and by allowing for some flexibility into the West's
demands, as a way to entice Milosevic to capitulate. Known as the Fischer Plan, it
helped to regain support of the campaign and to reduce criticism within Germany. The
plan involved continued air attacks combined with a Chapter VII Security Council
resolution in hopes of bring Milosevic back to the negotiating table. The resolution
incorporated most of the central demands of NATO and included the withdrawal of all
Serbian military, paramilitary and police forces; acceptance of an international peace
force with a Chapter VII mandate; and transitory administration of Kosovo authorized by
the United Nations. The only controversial part of the plan was the offer to suspend air
strikes once Belgrade began to withdrawal its forces and continued to do so. This was
rejected by the United States (Rudolf, 2000, p. 139).
Although this proposal was not accepted as presented, it did have two important
consequences. Germany was able to demonstrate to the international community the
importance of including Moscow in the diplomatic process which it had been concerned
about from the beginning. The proposal also included suggestions that would finally
entice Milosevic to actually accept the settlement including involving the G-8, and the
United Nations (Daalder & O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 166).

Framing Strategies
A. Initial Use of Force
Most of the political debate in the Bundestag, regarding the use of force, took
place before the Rambouillet Conference during the decision to support NATO's
activation order. That was the time, shortly after the new government took office, that
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German policy towards participation in NATO and the Yugoslavian conflict was
developed. The only major debates about the use of force took place within the Green
Party.
Unlike Italy, the key players in the German government, Chancellor Schroder,
Defense Minister Scharping, and Foreign Minister Fischer, used similar frames and
supported Germany's participation. Most of the frames were drawn on lessons from
history and it was difficult for any of the parties, particularly those on the Left, to oppose
fighting a moral war for human rights against Milosevic' s form of fascism. Framing the
war as one being fought for moral values rather than national interest reduced domestic
resistance particularly among the Greens (Rudolf, 2000, p. 134-135) and prevented
alternative frames from developing. The prevailing frame was that the use of military
force was the last resort in order to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe.
In a speech given by Foreign Minister Fischer on 15 April 1999, he said that the
war spelled an end of the futile appeasement of Milosevic. Defense Minister Scharping
framed involvement around historic parallels following the code "Never again
Auschwitz" (Rudolf, 2000, p. 134-135). He frequently described Serbian concentration
camps and made references to ethnic cleansing and expatriation with the Holocaust as a
means of emphasizing Germany's special responsibility (Duke, Ehrart, & Karadi, 2000,
p. 133). He reiterated why Germany was involved in the conflict at a press conference in
May when he said,
We have to make understandable for our citizens that we are within an
action after 9 years of wars, after 4 wars in the Balkans provoked by
Milosevic, after more than 80 United Nations resolution. Every United
Nation resolution was broken by Milosevic, there was month per month,
year per year strong political effort to solve the problems in a peaceful
way. (Scharping, May 25, 1999)
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Chancellor Schroder's statements followed these same framing strategies. In
addition, he chose to frame his comments on a rejection of a German Sonderweg, or
separate path. He stressed Germany's participation in NATO as proof of its willingness
to integrate into the Western alliances. This frame was easier to accept for the
conservatives who were unhappy with the references to Auschwitz.
In a statement made the day the airstrikes began, Schroder explained to the
German people why NATO was taking military action but stressed that it was not
a war. He said that
Milosevic is waging a relentless war in Kosovo ... Yugoslav forces have
stepped up their terror against the Albanian majority in Kosovo. The
international community can no longer watch the human tragedy this has
caused in that part of Europe without taking action. We are not waging
war. We are however called upon to enforce a peaceful solution in
Kosovo even under the use of military means. (Schroder, March 24, 1999)
Schroder viewed Germany's participation in the NATO operation as a test. In a speech to
the Bundestag he said
Given our German history, we cannot leave any doubt about our
reliability, determination and steadfastness. Germany's integration in the
western community of nations is part and parcel of our raison d'etre. We
do not want a separate lane for Germany. And we must recognize that
Germany's role has changed following the collapse of state socialism. We
cannot shirk our responsibility. (Auerswald & Auerswald, 2000, p. 866)
Schroder was also careful when discussing German involvement to describe the role and
opinions that NATO, the UN and the EU were sharing. During his policy statement
delivered to the Bundestag on 22 April 1999 he said the
Alliance was and still is - that is important to emphasize - at all times
ready to respond to any credible signal: finding a political solution to the
conflict is the focus of all our efforts. NATO has, in agreement with the
Secretary General of the United Nations and also the European Union, set
out its conditions for suspending the air-strikes. (Schroder, 22 April 1999)
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Each of these frames was repeated during an interview in April when Schroder
explained his position on German involvement in the military operations in Kosovo.
When asked why it was important for Germany to be involved he answered "we are
trying to contain the ongoing human catastrophe-to stop the killings and deportations."
He also took that opportunity to express to the world that the Germany is "no longer a
divided nation and ... our partners, both in Europe and the United States, would have
misunderstood it if we had opted out" (Weymouth, April 26, 1999, p. 33). For Germany
it was a particularly difficult decision to intervene in the Balkans because Hitler had
committed a number of atrocities there. Schroder responded to this concern by
explaining how that could no longer be an excuse, rather "we are now under a moral
obligation to help stop new atrocities being committed there" (Weymouth, April 26,
1999, p. 33). When questioned about how to reconcile the conflict between the sayings
'Never again war' and 'Never again Auschwitz,' Schroder replied that "there is a higher
principal that we have to uphold, namely to stop the killings and deportations."
(Weymouth, April 26, 1999, 33)

Party response to the use offorce
Within the SPD party, local organizations in Saxony-Anhalt and Bavaria
demanded a bombing pause and immediate negotiation and the Greens had difficulty
reconciling differences within its own party. The Greens were internally divided between
the purist wing that supported isolationism and no military force, and a moderate wing
that was willing to cooperate with NATO (Ramet & Coffin, 2001, p. 60). On 15 April
1999, 917 deputies, officials, and members of the Green party signed an anti-war
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manifest. An additional thousand signatures caused concern, domestically and
internationally, about the stability of the German government. A special conference was
called to debate the Kosovo issue in May 1999. Prior to the meeting Foreign Minister
Fischer appealed to the delegates by reiterating the same frames used for the public, but
with stronger conviction. He said "stopping the attacks would send a completely wrong
signal. . .I ask you to help me, to back me, not to cut me off at the knees" (Ursula Sautter,
May 24, 1999, p. 31 ). Also in this speech he listed the more than 70 United Nations
resolutions that have failed to bring peace to the Balkans and placed blame on Milosevic
(Cohen, May 14, 1999, p. Al). Others at the Bielefeld conference used the same frames
to further emphasize their positions. Deputy Foreign Minister Ludger Volmer described
Mr. Milosevice's planning and execution of a policy of destruction of the ethnic Albanian
population of Kosovo and declared "My friends, there is only [one] word for this, and
that word in Fascism" (quoted in Cohen, May 14, 1999, p. Al).
At this conference Foreign Minister Fischer convinced the delegates to reject a
resolution calling for a unilateral halt of NATO attacks. He also threatened to resign over
this issue because if it was passed he would refuse to take it up with the coalition. The
party ultimately voted 444 to 318 to continue to back NATO's military operations in
Kosovo. (Wall Street Journal, May 14, 1999, p. Al2). Although the vote was what
Fischer needed it did little to help stabalize the Green Party. Defections began as soon as
the vote was over, including Eckhart Stratmann, a founding member and former M.P.
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Public Opinion
Because the parties generally accepted the frames chosen there was broad support
for involvement when the war began. There was majority support throughout the
airstrikes but it gradually declined as the conflict continued. There was a noticeable
difference in the degree of support between the parties and opposition in public opinion
reflected historical reservations about NATO among former East Germany.
In looking at differences between former East and West Germans, a poll
conducted in mid April found that 72 percent of West Germans and 50 percent of East
Germans believed the air raids were justified, and 22 percent of West and 3 8 percent of
East Germans expressed negative opinions of the war. Support of the Bundeswehr was
supported by 70 percent of the West, 41 percent of the East, while 25 percent of West and
48 percent of East were opposed (Duke, Ehrart, & Karadi, 2000, p. 134). These numbers
show that the public agreed with the idea of German responsibility as a NATO member.
Support for participation was also seen in the Green party with 57 percent of those
leaning towards the Green in favor of the intervention. In May support for the military
intervention declined to 52 percent with 44 percent thinking that it was wrong to attack
Yugoslavia. Most of this decline came from the Greens with only 38 percent of those
favoring the Greens now in support of the operation (Rudolf, 2000, p. 136).
One of the frames used stressed the human rights atrocities being carried out by
Serbian forces under the control of Milosevic. A Deutschlandtrend poll conducted 31
March - 1 April 1999 asked respondents who they felt was responsible for the Kosovo
conflict. The findings show that the frame's message was being heard because 68
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percent of all respondents (72 percent in the West and 54 percent in the East) thought that
Serbia carried the main responsibility (Everts, 2001, p. 240).
Another series of polls found that support for the airstrikes rose until mid-April
then began to decline for the remainder of the war (Everts, 2001, p. 254). See Table 1.
Although most parties supported the military operation a Forschungsgruppe Wahler poll
from April found some distinctions in the level of support. See Table 2.

Table 1. General Support for NATO Action
Question: 'Do you think it is right that NATO has
intervened militarily in the Kosovo conflict with
airstrikes?' (%of supporters)
Bombing began March 24, 1999
March 26, 1999
57%
March 29, 1999
60
April 1, 1999
61
April 6, 1999
60
April 13, 1999
62
April 16, 1999
66
April 23, 1999
61
April 30, 1999
56
May 4, 1999
58
Chinese embassy bombing occurred
on May 7, 1999
May 10, 1999
52

I

Table 2. Political Party Support
Question: 'Should the German army and air force be involved
in the conflict? '
Yes
Party
No
63%
34%
All
Social Democrats
71
27
Christian Democrats/CSU
68
30
68
Greens
31
64
Liberals
36
27
Ex-Communists (PDS)
69
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Prior to the use of force public support already existed for German
participation therefore the frames used by Schroder and his team did not have to persuade
or influence the public to accept the country's involvement. None of the framing
strategies was intended to counter the two largest influences on public opinion; party
affiliation and geographical divisions between the former East and West Germany. The
frames, however, were successful in maintaining a high level of support throughout the
conflict, unlike in the United States and Italy where public support declined as the
conflict continued.

B. Response to Strike on Chinese Embassy.

Throughout the conflict, Germany played a lead role in attempting to placate
China. Schroder had planned a four-day official visit with Prime Minister Zhu but had to
change those plans to a single day visit in order to convey NATO's apologies for the
bombing. He was the first head of government from among the NATO members to visit
Beijing after the bombing. Additionally, as EU president, he had to express apologies on
behalf of the European Union members participating in the NATO operations for the
accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. During a meeting with NATO
Secretary General Javier Solana, the day before his visit to Beijing, Schroder expressed
his dissatisfaction with the explanation offered thus far. He took the lead in insisting that
the bombing was fully investigated by NATO because he was unsatisfied with the
explanation of an outdated map. He also assured Prime Minister Zhu Rongji that a
thorough investigation would be carried out. (Duke, Ehrart, & Karadi, 2000, p. 135).
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During a press conference NATO spokesman Jamie Shea announced that
Schroder would be traveling to Beijing that week to express regrets on behalf of the
Alliance and "would be making the point that this was a mistake and no more than a
mistake" (Shea, May 9, 1999). Schroder did acknowledge the bombing was a mistake,
but did so with a degree of cynicism when he told the press "I am not saying NATO did
not want to hit the building. I am saying the building was hit without NATO knowing it
was the Chinese Embassy" (quoted in Pollack, May 12, 1999).
While China appreciated the apology made by Schroder, they were not satisfied
with it. The Chinese also discredited the explanation for the bombing and Chinese
Foreign Minister Zhu Bangzao repeated Beijiing's 'four solemn demands:' United States
led NATO alliance must issue a formal apology, provide an explanation, carry out an
investigation into the matter and mete out punishment to individuals found responsible
(Deutsche Presse-Agentur, May 13, 1999).
Despite this Schroder was successful in delivering his message because he was
able to continue discussions with Prime Minister Zhu and President Jiang Zemin
regarding the proposed G-8 peace plan that "could provide a basis for a political
solution". When the press corps asked Schroder about his inability to persuade Chinese
leaders to follow a common line with NATO in the UN Security Council, he reminded
them that "No talks would have meant even less movement" (This week in Germany,
May 14, 1999).
In Italy, there were an increased number of protests in response to the embassy
bombing which forced the government to justify its continued involvement in the
operation. In the United States, the Clinton administration had to explain the bombing as
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an accident and an unfortunate consequence of military action. In Germany, by calling
for a complete investigation of the incident, the frame shifted the blame away from their
own involvement and placed the fault on the United States and NATO command. This
prevented a public reaction like was seen in other countries. The media focused attention
on the anti-American protests in China as a way of setting the stage for Chancellor
Schroder's visit the following week. The Green Party, the group most likely to protest
after the bombing, knew they would have their own opportunity to protest Germany's
continued involvement at the special party conference to be held later in the month so
they did not need to react at the time.

C. Use ofground forces.

This was the first time since World War II that Germany was involved in an
offensive military operation, and as such, framing was needed to convey to the public the
limits of its participation. For most of the political parties the use of ground forces was
not acceptable. Schroder made it clear that he too was opposed to their use and was
willing to go against NATO plans in order to defend that position if necessary.
Early in the conflict Schroder began emphasizing his position. A spokesperson
for the Chancellor explained that "the deployment of ground troops is not an issue."
(quoted in Deutche Press - Agentur, April 9, 1999) On that same day Schroder said in an
RTL television interview that "the German government sees no reason to change its
strategy. We have made it clear that we do not want deployment [of] ground troops"
(quoted in Deutche Press -Agentur, April 9, 1999).
Even though NATO Allies, such as Great Britain, were pushing for the use of
ground force and other members were discussing their possible use, Schroder continued
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his rejection of deploying ground troops throughout the conflict. At the conclusion of
NATO's Washington Summit, Schroder announced "The debate on ground forces is no
longer on the table ... There will be no change in the strategy of sending NATO ground
forces into Kosovo only after Yugoslavia agreed to a peace settlement" (National Journal,
May 1, 1999, p. 1180). During a news conference on May 18 Schroder declared that "I
am against any change of NATO strategy" (quoted in Cohen, May 20, 1999, p. A14).
regarding the use of ground troops. During a television interview later that day he
reiterated his point when he said "It is my view that we will not deploy ground troops in
Yugoslavia" (quoted in Cohen, May 20, 1999, p. A14). He threatened to veto any
proposal to send in ground troops even if no German troops were involved (New York
Times, May 20, 1999, p. Al).
Foreign Minister Fischer reinforced Schroder's position on ground forces when he
explained that Germany opposed NATO forces entering Kosovo unless a settlement was
first reached with Milosevic. Germany did support the NATO plan to enlarge the
security force outside of Kosovo with the understanding that this force would be used
only to escort refugees back to their homes after a settlement (Perlez, May 26, 1999, p.
A16).
As with all of the issues related to Operation Allied Force, the political parties
sent clear messages to the public, in the form of resolutions, regarding their positions on
ground forces. In April the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) passed a resolution
supporting NATO's intervention but rejecting any inclusion of German troops in a
NATO ground force and declaring that the use ground troops in combat against Serb
forces would carry 'incalculable risks' (Frankfurter Allgemeine, April 26, 1999, p. 1).
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The Green party at their conference in May, although they rejected a resolution to halt
German involvement in the bombings, did make it clear that they would not support
sending German troops into ground combat or consent to NATO participation in a ground
war even without German participation (Rudolf, 2000, p. 138).

Public Opinion

An 8-10 April survey, conducted by Forsa, found that 55 percent of Germans
opposed and only 33 percent favored the deployment of ground troops, "if the airstrikes
are not sufficient to restore peace." That was a slight increase in support compared to a
25-26 March poll that showed only 28 percent were in favor and 61 percent were
opposed. These same polls indicated that if NATO were to use ground forces then the
public would be somewhat more supportive of having the Bundeswher participate. The
April survey found that 46 percent said 'yes' they should participate and 45 percent felt
'no' they should not participate. Support for this issue also increased since the poll in
March found that only 36 percent answered 'yes' and 61 percent answered 'no' when
asked the same question (USIA, April 28, 1999).
With most of the public opposed to the use of force, distinctions can once again
be made between the parties. The Greens, with their traditional pacifist stance, were the
party most strongly opposed to the use of ground troops, with the exception of the ExComm~sts

who were also the ones most opposed to the overall participation. The other

parties were closer to the overall sentiment of the country. See Table 3.
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Table 3. Party Opposition to Ground Forces
Question: 'Should NATO send in wound troops?'
Party
Yes
No
All
27%
68%
Social Democrats
32
64
Christian Democrats/CSU
32
64
Greens
19
77
Liberals
38
61
Ex-Communists (PDS)
16
83
(Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Mannheim, as printed in Economist, April 24, 1999)

With opposition this strong, it would have been difficult for any framing strategy
to offset public opinion. Schroder was successful in maintaining support for the air
offensive by using strong framing that acknowledged the public and party's opinions.
Had he chosen a different approach, or been less willing to take a stand on this issue
among the Allies, he may have risked losing overall support for the operation. This
frame also helped bring stability to his own ruling government by placating the concerns
of his coalition partners, the Greens. They were willing to support the air strikes, but the
use of ground troops may have deepened the rift that was forming between the factions.

D. Influence over target selection.
Because Germany only had a small involvement in the military missions being
undertaken they had little say in decisions about target selection. The United States,
France and Great Britain were making most of those decisions, although Germany
approved of the overall targeting process (Priest, September 21, 1999). Irritation within
the German elite and in the public grew about NATO's Zielplanung (targeting) as more
mistakes took place. Support within the Green and SPD parties eroded with NATO
forces targeting more Serbian infrastructures (Rudolf, 2000, p. 138) and causing nearly
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500 civilian casualties. In May after a stray missile damaged an ambassador's residence
in Belgrade, Fischer said it was time to talk about targeting and what targets NATO chose
to hit (Bruce, May 22, 1999). At a press conference later that week, Defense Minister
Scharping expressed his views on targeting when he said "we have to attack Yugoslav
forces within Kosovo, that we have to attack strategic targets in the whole of Yugoslavia
and if you are looking on the targeting process, we didn't enter phase three" (Scharping,
May 25, 1999). In terms of the damage done to other buildings and civilian casualties he
explained that "only 12 mistakes is a very small percentage" and that "NATO is strong
on the point to be careful with civilian life and to protect it as well as possible"
(Scharping, May 25, 1999). Environment Minister and Green party member, Juergen
Trittin, expressed his party's concern over targeting when he explained "for me its not
right that NATO planes should drop splinter bombs and attack civilian targets such as
power plants and TV stations. That has to stop" (Sharma, May 30, 1999). General Clark
confirmed that Germany did not support phases that involved expanding air raids to civil
targets such as power plants and oil refineries (Duke, Ehrart, & Karadi, 2000, p. 135).
Unlike the strategies used to justify the use of force, there was no clear frame
being used by the government to justify the target selection. As more civilian targets
were hit and more mistakes occurred, this lack of framing allowed various members of
the government to make their own statements without opposing the position of other
members of the coalition. This also provided the Greens with an outlet to vocalize their
position without contradicting the frames being used by Fischer to help stabilize the
coalition.
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Evaluation ofStrategy
Even though Germany threatened to veto the use of ground forces they were
supportive players in the Alliance during the conflict. Schroder gave support even before
taking office and Germany developed a peace plan that was ultimately accepted by all of
the members of the UN Security Council as well as Milosevic. Domestically, Germany
was successful in overcoming history and was able to keep the coalition government
together even as factions within the Greens continued to grow stronger. The frames used
were able to balance the concerns of the public and the parties allowing Germany to show
the international communities that they could overcome internal pressures and were ready
to take a more active role in NATO.
Overall, Germany contributed to the ultimate success of NATO's operation.
According to Klaus Naumann, "it was not the German leaders who are delaying the
decision or going wobbly. In fact, Chancellor Schroder, Foreign Minister Fischer, and
Defense Minister Scharping have proven the center of resolve in Europe. They have
never wavered. For the Greens to agree to the use of the German air force in a combat
operation without a United Nations mandate is extraordinary" (National Journal, May 1,
1999, p. 1180). The United States State Department agreed when a source said,
"Schroder has shown remarkable leadership in maintaining such a high degree of support
in Germany for the NATO position" (National Journal, May 1, 1999, p. 1180).
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CONCLUSION

Summary offindings
This thesis demonstrates how and why the leaders of the United States, Italy and
Germany governments each used a different framing strategy to convey their reasons for
participating in Operation Allied Force. Each country emphasized the humanitarian
aspects of intervention and tried to convey a commitment to multilateral diplomacy
within the alliance. The differences in each government's framing strategies were the
result of domestic concerns and the political environment they operated in. In the United
States, the Clinton administration had to address Congress's concerns shortly after they
concluded the impeachment process. Italy, operating under a newly formed coalition,
had to deal with multiple political party opinions and skepticism of their reliability by
other allies. Germany had to overcome historical barriers to participating in a military
operation and try to maintain a stable coalition government made up of pacifists.
The target audience of their frames also varied from one country to the other
because of the political climate. The United States directed its frames to the general
public after reaching a consensus for action among the leadership. This united front
helped demonstrate to Milosevic and the NATO allies that the United States was
committed to the operation's success. Italy divided its focus between the international
community, political parties and the public. By allowing leaders to voice differing
opinions about participation it helped the opposition to feel like their views were
represented. It also allowed a newly elected leader to gain credibility and reliability in
the international community. Germany's primary target audience was the Green Party,
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protecting the stability of the coalition government. In each case the leaders were aware
of where their opposition came from and focused attention on addressing those concerns.
The success of the frames used to raise support for the military action was
demonstrated by the rally events that took place in the United States and Italy. In the
United States, there was an increase in overall support of the airstrikes after Clinton and
his cabinet members repeatedly explained their frame in the days following the start of
the campaign. In Italy, support for the operation remained low, but contradicted a rise in
support of NATO and Italy's responsibility to that organization, resulting from D' Alema
and Dini reiterating that frame in the media. Germany did not see a rally event like the
other two countries because public support was consistently high throughout the conflict.
Domestic concerns did little to influence the country's involvement in the
operation. The government leaders determined how the country would participate and
then explained their position through frames. They may have considered the opposition's
concerns in deciding what their role in the operation would be, but the findings indicate
that there was little change in position throughout the conflict. Only with the issue of the
use of ground forces did the position begin to change. In the cases of the United States
and Italy, as NATO and allies, such as Great Britain, continued to push for the use of
ground forces, these two countries continued to express their resistance to the idea but
conceded that they would participate if NATO decided to use ground troops. Germany
was the only country that continued to stand firm in its stance that they would oppose the
use of ground troops in a hostile environment. They were willing to go against the
NATO allies and veto any proposal because the stability of their own government would
have been at stake.
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Regardless of the reasons for the frames or the groups they tried to convince, the
strategies used by these countries was ultimately successful. Despite the possibility of
Italy and Germany withdrawing support of the operation, all of the countries in the case
studies continued to be actively involved in Operation Allied Force and were able to
contribute to its success. They were able to find a way to work with their opposition and
maintain a level of support that was satisfactory.
In each country there was little attempt by the opposition to introduce alternative
frames. Because the official frames stressed the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo and
Milosevic's history of violence, it was difficult to develop a counter frame that the public
was willing to support. There was little reliable information being released from within
Kosovo during the seventy-eight day event, so people were dependent on the government
leaders as the source for information and were not able to make a case for a counter
argument. In Germany and Italy where multiple political parties and coalitions may have
been able to produce alternative frames that people would adopt they chose not to do so
in order to protect their positions within the government. The Green Party in both
countries knew that by withdrawing support of the current leaders they would also be
giving up influence in other areas that were important to them. In each case it was
beneficial for the opposition to acquiesce to the frames being presented by the
government's leaders.

Policy implications
Past research has dealt with lessons learned from the war in Kosovo. This thesis
contributes to those lessons by demonstrating the relationship between member countries
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and the alliance. NATO, as a regional alliance, must find a way to balance the interests
of each member country with the overarching interests of the organization. During
Operation Allied Force, this thesis shows that the government leaders were responsive to
domestic concerns by addressing them in their framing strategies. While the members
countries in these case studies were supportive of the NATO goals, they were not willing
to risk the stability of their governments. Germany was vowing to veto any request for
ground forces because it knew that the Green party would no longer support the operation
if ground troops were used, which could lead to a collapse of the coalition government.
The United States, also was unwilling to fully commit to ground troops because of the
lack of support it would receive in Congress. This study also shows that although a
country may be willing to participate in a NATO operation it may convey a different
degree of participation through its internal framing. Examples of this were seen when the
United States was very involved in target selection but chose to downplay its
involvement when discussing the topic, in order to emphasize the fact that this was a
NATO operation and again with Italy's dual framing strategy. In future operations,
NA TO will need to distinguish each country's actual level of commitment and reliability
from the messages conveyed in the frames.
Additional findings in this study reveal that NATO cannot rely on its members to
convey to the international public a frame that differs from the one used locally. In some
instances, such as Italy's questioning the continued use of force, the domestic frames
contradict the messages that the alliance is trying to communicate, which weakens the
coalition. NATO will need to rely on its own framing strategies and leadership team to
convey their own position and show cohesiveness among the members. Timely release
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of information framed in a way that the members can use to address their domestic
constituents will help ensure a unified presentation.

Contributions to research
Earlier research on Allied Force, most closely related to the questions posed in
this thesis, focused on the role the media played in transmitting the government's position
to the people and its failure to critically assess the information they were given but did
not look at reasons behind the frames. This thesis examined the media (i.e. newspapers,
newswires, television, press releases, and public interviews) as the vehicle to transmit the
government's position rather than a tool to influence it. The findings, based upon
Alexander George's structured focused case study methodology, supplement previous
research by demonstrating linkages between government frames and public opinion and
explaining the reasons the frames were used. It also supplements earlier research by
concentrating on the country and its leaders as the principal unit of analysis, rather than
NATO as solely a regional military alliance. Although the thesis looked at the Kosovo
situation and the country's relationship with NATO, further research can use these
findings as a comparison to other humanitarian interventions and under other
international auspices where domestic concerns need to be balanced with the operation's
overall goals.
Additional research is needed to show how other countries framed their issues.
This thesis did not consider the issues being dealt with by NATO's new members or
those countries outside of NATO that did not support the goals or tactics used.
Additionally, the time period used to investigate the framing strategies was limited to
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primarily the seventy-eight days of the military operation. Further investigation may
want to focus on the additional frames used to continue participation in the peacekeeping
and rebuilding phases of the operation. These may be substantially different than what
was used during the military operation because the need for humanitarian intervention is
not as dire and there is no easy way to measure completion or success. Furthermore, this
thesis only examined public opinion during the conflict. A review of post conflict public
opinion can be done to see if the frames were strong enough to withstand assessment and
critiques of Operation Allied Force.
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